

THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

LAMBETH AND MARRIAGE

THE review which we publish this month by the Master of Corpus on Section II. of the Lambeth Conference Report, or rather on that part of it which dealt with the subject of birth-control, was originally intended to stand by itself; and we had not expected to do more than indicate our general agreement with him. Since the review was received, however, Professor N. P. Williams asked whether he might submit a short article on the subject, on the other side, with special reference to Rabbinic teaching; and it seemed to us due, both to his own learning and to the cause which he represents, that the case should be fully put. The delay which this involved, moreover, is not wholly to be regretted, since it enables us to deal at the same time with some criticisms which Dr. Gore has made upon what we wrote in the September issue of this Journal; and we have had the opportunity of consultation with Fr. Wilfred Knox and others whose judgment we much value. We may add that we do not propose to publish any comments or correspondence on the reviews published this month; nor do we intend to open our pages to controversy on the subject.

Further consideration of the Lambeth Resolutions and of the correspondence in the *Church Times* to which it has given rise has not led us to modify the view we expressed in September as to the substantial soundness of the guidance given by the Conference; nor are we shaken by Dr. Williams' criticism.* At

* The answer to the charge of sacrilege is surely this: that the appeal to "the divine creativeness" is only one of the ends of intercourse, and that the Church has always recognized the act to be legitimated by the other ends of marriage, when that one was impossible of fulfilment. Further, we cannot accept Dr. Williams' phrase about God being "by His own appointment . . . constrained to put forth a certain outflow of creative energy," nor the argument based on it. For (1) God can only be said to put out His "creative energy" (in this sense) in cases where conception actually takes place; and (2) God cannot be said to have "reserved to Himself the decision" as to whether conception shall result from intercourse, if in fact knowledge of the natural laws involved enables man to determine that it does not occur—unless Dr. Williams would claim that the use of knowledge to control nature is unnatural and wrong.

bottom, we believe that the case against birth-control can be stated in a sentence: it is that the sexual impulse is something so elemental, because so bound up with "the divine creativeness" (to use Dr. Williams' phrase), that it should be controlled only by something equally elemental—namely, the will strengthened by grace. Such a judgment on the issue is, for those who make it, intuitive and final. This dependence on intuitive judgments, however, extending as it does beyond fundamental principles to particular issues, involves a very extreme form of the intuitionist theory of ethics. Furthermore it effects a marked separation between the trust which may be given to long-standing religious judgments on ethical issues and that which may be given to them in other fields of truth. Such a separation is unsatisfactory from the point of view of theology, since whatever infallibility the Church possesses has always been held to apply alike to faith and morals. Again, Professor Williams seems to us to take an entirely static view of the Church's "intuition." At one time that "intuition" regarded matrimony itself as almost reprehensible; it tolerated slavery and views of the position of women which have only been modified in recent times; it regarded persecution as justifiable, if not indeed a duty. That is why the appeal to the Vincentian cause seems to us to fail. It can often be pleaded in the interests of the conservative view; but at any given moment it may be modified and cease to be applicable. In such cases the argument which Dr. Williams draws from our Lord's silences seems particularly dangerous and misleading. In the case before us, there is no question, of course, of saying that the instinct against the use of contraceptives is all wrong, but of saying that it is too simple to cover all circumstances.

We turn now to Roman Catholic criticism. Cardinal Bourne, at Swansea, may claim that Rome is unswerving in her condemnation of birth-control; but the facts are far more complex than he would have the public believe. The general principles of the Roman position are these. The authorities that can bind are:

- (1) Solemn definitions of Popes and Councils.
- (2) The common teaching of the Universal Church, represented by the Bishops.
- (3) Decisions of Roman congregations.
- (4) The common teaching of theologians.

With regard to the particular case before us:

- (1) There are no solemn definitions. (2) The common

teaching of the Universal Church can only be ascertained negatively, because the Bishops as a whole have not spoken. They seem, however, to tolerate the ordinary opinion of theologians, and would probably, if forced to give judgment, condemn the contrary. (3) The Inquisition (May 21, 1861) has condemned Onanism as contrary to the natural law; and the Sacred Penitentiary (March 10, 1886) said that *regulariter* (a phrase that implies exceptions) confessors are bound to question penitents whom they suspect of contraceptive practices. These Roman decrees, however, are of a Congregation and therefore not infallible and not absolutely binding. (4) The ordinary teaching of theologians is that such practices are against the natural law.

Further, if the common opinion of theologians can be proved to be that of the Bishops, it becomes infallible and binding, though not certainly so until there is a definition of Pope or Council. In the meanwhile, it is lawful to advance serious reasons against the accepted opinion, but it would probably be temerarious. In practice, a Roman priest may be liberal or rigorist. There is a school of theologians who hold that it is better to say nothing and to leave people in good faith: Génicot, Gury, Arregui, all of them Jesuits, represent this view. Génicot, for example, writes (*Theologiæ Moralis Institutiones*, Brussels, 1909, Vol. II., p. 568):

Quandoque occurrunt pœnitentes qui monente confessario iterum iterumque respondent se non posse in animum suum inducere mortalem onanismi reatum, præsertim quando gravissimas causas habent abstinendi a copula, puta quia medicus declaravit vel experientia ostendit novum partum fore valde periculosum uxori, jam liberis onustæ, ipsi autem, ad venerea valde propensi, actibus imperfectis contenti esse moraliter nequeant. Cum hujusmodi hominibus, præsertim si ex reliqua vita sat boni christiani esse dignoscuntur, *prudenti dissimulatione uti* [in thick type in text] posse confessarium opinamur. Sicut nequit onanismum tunc positive permittere, ita ab eodem sub pœna denegandæ absolutionis huic homini interdicens abstinere posse videtur.

That is an admission of the reality of the problem and of the need for some method of escaping in practice a strict application of the rigorist position. But it seems to us that the recognition of exceptional cases and circumstances by the Bishops at Lambeth is decidedly preferable to a strict condemnation on paper accompanied by a "prudent dissimulation" in practice, which experience has shown to be inevitable.

The question has been asked why Lambeth could not have left the matter alone, or at least referred it to a committee for further consideration. The answer is that there was a widespread demand among Christian people for guidance on the subject. It is rarely easy to say what exactly it is that brings a particular issue to the fore at a particular time; the cause lies usually in a combination of circumstances converging on the point. But when once the issue had been raised as one that touched the Christian conscience very nearly, Lambeth could not have avoided facing it, and in facing it they were bound to be guided (unless they were to be false to Anglican principles) by reason no less than by tradition.

The position, in effect, was that a long-standing tradition of moral teaching was called in question, and called in question within the Church. We understand that many who voted in the majority would have been glad to find a reason adequate to vindicate the tradition, but found none. That being the case, it was necessary to try to get at what was really sound and permanent in the tradition, and build on that.

And what does the appeal to reason, in this case, amount to? What are those permanent things in the Christian tradition of marriage which it brings out in light all the stronger because they are not obscured by accretions? There is, first, our Lord's teaching about marriage—how final and indissoluble it is, how rooted in the nature of man and woman, how complete the union it involves. There is, next, St. Paul's plain teaching about the union of husband and wife, and not least his teaching about conjugal intercourse in 1 Cor. vii. 3-6; and the context shows that St. Paul was then thinking of the *debitum*, not as something necessitated for purposes of procreation, but *ad fovendum amorem et ad sedendam concupiscentiam*. There is, thirdly, the teaching both of St. Paul and of St. Peter as to the "sobriety, temperance, and chastity" which should govern the relations of married people; and this teaching is emphasized over and over again in the Lambeth Report. And it is perhaps especially important to insist upon this in view of the truly astonishing contention that the qualified permission of contraceptives among the married leads logically to the condonation of their use outside marriage. That is to miss one of the root

* The use of Gen xxxviii. 8-10, to which Dr. Williams alludes, seems to us just such an accretion. The brief note in the *New Commentary*, *in loc.*, will show how irrelevant it is. Our attention has been called, further, to pp. 68, 69, and 371 of vol. iii. of Strack-Billerbeck's *Commentary on N.T.* The writers say, "The old synagogue held very lax views on this point," and give illustrative passages of a most unedifying nature to justify their summary.

principles of the Christian view of sex, viz., that the sexual impulse lies so close to the inmost springs of human personality that its exercise *apart from the context of the permanent and public social relationship of marriage* is wrong. It is wrong, that is to say, in isolation: right, when it is part of an open, legal, and binding moral contract consecrated by religion. That, as we understand it, is the intellectual position which lies at the back of the mystical virtue of chastity. And it is a position which even the simplest person can understand.

Finally, there is the principle of parenthood as the normal and primary end of marriage. The Lambeth Report makes it abundantly clear that the Conference endorses entirely the traditional teaching both of the Jewish and of the Christian Churches as to the duty and glory of parenthood. This is a matter in which religion, instinct, and common-sense conspire to the same end; and the refusal of parenthood on any but the gravest grounds is unhesitatingly condemned.

It is in that context that what Lambeth has to say about the use of contraceptives must be judged. The first and main issue which they say has to be faced can be expressed in the question: "Is it wrong to have another child?" The question by itself shows how far removed the Church's standpoint is from the considerations of selfishness, luxury, or mere convenience which have such weight in the world today; and we can imagine no better method of putting a stop to the immense amount of really wicked birth-control that exists than the steady forcing of that question upon the conscience. It is only when that question has been answered in the affirmative, and when a sound moral reason exists for not following the "primary and obvious" method of limitation—that of abstinence—that Lambeth agrees to the use of contraceptives. Such qualified permission publicly given involves, of course, a definite breach with the rigorist tradition; and, indeed, we go so far as to say, in definite contrast to Dr. Gore and Dr. Kirk, that in our judgment an Anglican confessor would not be entitled now to adopt a purely *a priori* rigorist position in the confessional. The insistence on motive, which is the dominant feature of Resolution 15, will give a confessor ample scope for guarding against laxity: to abandon that ground for one that is simply rigorist in principle would be, in our view, definitely wrong. Many cases are known where the insistence on complete abstinence has led to harmful, even disastrous, results. We need to remember that the Church has authority to loose as well as to bind.

We have already alluded to Dr. Gore's criticisms on some remarks in our September editorial. Dr. Gore's views on any religious question are necessarily important, and we differ from him with regret; but the present pamphlet adds little to what he has already said, and to the opinions which were known to be his before the Lambeth Conference. Brief comment, however, is necessary. Dr. Gore seeks to discount the opinion of psychologists as being dependent on Freud and Jung. The majority of psychologists are no mere followers of Freud and Jung, although few worthy of the name would deny that they had learnt much from their work, and especially that of Freud. The fact which we were concerned to emphasize is that, as we understand the position, almost every psychiatrist, or neurologist who is a psychologist, would hold it proved that there are a considerable number of cases in which, when it would be wrong to bring about conception, it is highly desirable on medical grounds to continue intercourse, using contraceptives to avoid pregnancy resulting, and that in such cases abstinence from intercourse may have disastrous results. Argument of this sort cannot be discounted because some psycho-analysts hold objectionable opinions or give objectionable advice.

Secondly, Dr. Gore suggests, in reference to a further remark in these notes, that medical opinion is now showing signs of moving more against birth-control. Elsewhere in the pamphlet (pp. 11, 12) he indicates his reasons. They seem to us not at all convincing. But one point perhaps requires special reference. Dr. Gore quotes the opinion of one gynæcologist that "all known methods of contraception are harmful to the female." The use of contraceptives, when pregnancy is undesirable, is, however, advocated by physicians of at least equal eminence; and a stronger piece of evidence is afforded by the fact that, at a recent conference, doctors from ten birth-control clinics were unanimous that in their experience no conditions harmful to the female could be traced to the use of contraceptives; while, as regards the general trend of medical opinion, the issue of the well-known Memorandum for the Ministry of Health, July, 1930, affords a clearer indication than any isolated opinion. Lastly, the implicit suggestion is quite unfounded that the experience of the Cambridge clinic has led those immediately concerned to have any doubts about the fact that the use of contraceptives is desirable in certain circumstances.

Opinions will differ as to the probable moral and social effect of the Lambeth pronouncement; but our own view is that its general results will be greater than its particular ones, and its eventual results greater than those which are to be found immediately. Its immediate and particular effects will not be large, we think, because so large a number of Christian people had already faced the issue for themselves, with or without the guidance of their clergy or confessors, and had come to a decision one way or another. We do not believe that these people will find themselves any nearer than before to those of their neighbours whose attitude to the problem has been frankly selfish and hedonistic. This section of the world has naturally laughed first, but its laughter is hollow. The parental instinct is too deep a thing to allow for much doubt as to its revenges on those who wantonly stifle it; and the cradle is still, even in the poorest home, the symbol of spiritual riches to husband and wife that few would deny or forego. And the example is infectious. The present writer recently baptized the eleventh child of a carter's wife, a woman of forty-five, proud of her husband and her family. She and all her children are healthy and strong. The eldest daughter is now herself married and has a child of her own; and she said that she hoped her mother would have no more children, as her hands were so full at home, but that she and her husband felt that, with such an example, they "must now do their bit." Such faith and courage are perhaps more common than is realized, and their contribution to the great social experiment which civilization is now making is of the highest importance. But we do not believe that the Church will be doing its best by such qualities by adhering to any rigorist position about birth-control. On the contrary, we think that her guidance will be valued and respected by mankind precisely in the measure in which it is not *a priori* unsympathetic. In other words, we believe that the Church will best promote chastity and serve the true ends of Christian marriage by a spirit that combines fidelity to the highest principles with a liberal faith in reason, and not least in the reasonableness of the rising generation. After all, is not that how we seek to pass on the Faith to our own children?

CHRISTIANITY AND MORALITY: SOME REFLECTIONS UPON THE PRESENT SITUATION*

WE are all of us aware of grave moral issues confronting Christian people at the present time. This paper will be concerned with the essentials of the situation now before us rather than with the details of particular problems. Vast changes have been, and are, taking place, which seem to many to be the prelude to a new chapter in man's moral history. Is it possible for us to get at the heart of the new factors which are at work; and, if so, can we also discern those Christian principles with which the new challenge is to be met?

I

The first point to be noticed is that a movement which began as a revolt against conventional standards of morality is now passing into something more positive. Iconoclasm cannot be the last word of any movement. It represents usually the first step and the easiest. When the old conventions have been fully criticized and finally condemned, what is to take their place? The repudiation of other people's ethical codes is not in itself a sufficiently positive standard for the guidance of the moral life. The attack upon the moral conventions of our grandparents has now been carried through to its conclusion, and the conclusion is seen to involve the necessity of a new construction. We are passing from the demand for moral emancipation to a serious attempt to formulate a new morality.

Two books, recently published in America, illustrate this point—*A Preface to Morals*, by Walter Lippmann, and *The New Morality*, by Durant Drake. Both of these writers devote the first part of their respective books to explaining what may well be considered a cardinal tenet of the new morality—namely, its dissociation from all theological presuppositions. There is implied here something very much more than a criticism, however radical, of a traditional moral outlook associated with Christianity. The attitude of the new moralists towards religion is by no means uniform. But there would be general agreement amongst them in the opinion that the traditional dependence of morality upon religious beliefs constitutes a positive encumbrance, which must be set aside in the interests of the moral life as they understand it.

* A paper read before the Newcastle Theological Society.

From the religious point of view the most far-reaching characteristics of the new morality are not to be found primarily in its divergences from the traditional Christian code, startling as these may be. For what is here called the new morality includes great varieties of opinion upon particular points of morals, some of them extremely radical, others relatively conservative. The essence of the new attitude appears to be comprised under three principles: (i.) The foundations of morality are to be sought in the facts of human nature; (ii.) the facts are to be discovered by the empirical methods of science, and the moral order based upon the facts is to be built up through the assistance of scientific information and equipment; (iii.) the goal of this moral order is human happiness conceived without reference to religious sanctions or to a supernatural end.

These three points, taken together, give us the essentials of the new programme of morality. All else must be regarded as incidental detail or consequence; and it should be clear that it is only in the last of these three principles that there arises an inevitable conflict with Christian conceptions. For Christian faith, however, the third point overshadows the whole position. For us the facts of human nature include the facts of religion, without which any account of human life must be incomplete. So, too, a scientific interpretation of the facts should include an adequate explanation of the facts of religious experience and of those high transformations of character and conduct which have been interwoven with that experience in Christian history.

On the other hand, the best side of the new moralists is to be seen in their earnest desire to face up to the facts of life. The challenge to men to face up to reality is always salutary and must always command a respectful hearing. In fact, this challenge comes as a wholesome corrective to much that was open to criticism in the traditional attitude of Christian people. Moreover, the challenge in question arises out of a wider attitude, which includes some of the most hopeful elements in the modern outlook upon life. The scientific temper, with all the qualities which it represents, is perhaps the greatest spiritual asset of the age into which we have been born. It has subjected the foundations of Christian belief to a prolonged and testing scrutiny. We must not be surprised that it should go further and subject to the same scrutiny the foundations of all religion and of all morality. If loss as well as gain accompanies the process, we may be sure that nothing but more grievous loss could result, should we seek to evade this necessary operation or to burke its consequences. We have long been familiar with the fact that an unbeliever may be sincere in his unbelief. We

have now to recognize that an unorthodox moralist may be intellectually sincere in his ethical unorthodoxy. Only upon this basis can the present ethical conflict be conducted in a way which goes to the root of the matter. Homiletic appeals to men to embrace the Christian ethical standard are poisoned at their source, if there is reason to suspect that we are not giving serious attention to an interpretation of the facts which is advanced in all seriousness.

Moreover, this appeal to the arbitrament of scientific thought may yet prove to be a sovereign remedy against the worst excesses of the romantic movement. The new morality is limited to no special allegiance beyond its appeal to the facts of life. But the earlier stages of the modern ethical revolt developed under the dominance of romantic ideas. It may be suspected that elements in the new morality so derived constitute its most awkward legacy today. We may venture to hope that some of the more unblushing doctrines of modern hedonism will prove incapable of standing up against the cold douche of calm scientific inquiry.

II

The reliance of the new moralists upon a scientific attitude towards the facts of life raises a very complex question. It is indisputable that civilization has emerged in history through man's capacity to gain the mastery over the raw materials of nature. Science itself in one of its most important aspects consists in the development of this capacity to exercise control over nature. Further, we certainly cannot exclude human nature from the domain of brute fact over which this control is exercised. Now our present civilization differs from those of earlier epochs in history, not simply in the immense predominance which science has attained, but even more in the fact that we have discovered a technique of invention,* to the further possibilities of which no definite limits can be assigned. It is not surprising, therefore, that the proved capacity of science to solve human problems should have become a dominating factor in modern discussions of ethics, regarded as the science of human conduct.

There are two ways in which this new factor enters into the discussion of ethical problems. In the first place, it is obvious that science gives promise of enormous transformations in the material environment of human life. In the second place, the psychological group of sciences suggest in various ways the possibility of equally important transformations in man's mental life—transformations, therefore, in our inward reaction

* "An invention of invention" (Lippmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-235).

to the pressure of environment. Each of these possibilities has been discussed in recent literature. It has also been argued by Mr. Bertrand Russell that the changes in our control over material environment are already bringing about the possibility of new methods of mass-control over men's mental and spiritual life.* Predictions based upon such new possibilities have been exceedingly diverse, some optimistic and others pessimistic.† But although it is by no means agreed as to what conclusions should be drawn, the general result has undoubtedly meant for many a strengthening of the tendency to believe that science is destined to provide the solution of all human problems, including the problems of the good life.

Now there is a sense in which the Christian believer can and should concede the whole of this position without surrendering in the smallest degree the full and exclusive claims of the Christian religion. For on Christian presuppositions we are here to co-operate with God in the fulfilment of His purposes for the human race. Such co-operation involves the fullest exercise of reason and the fullest possible use of all the resources of creation, both in our material environment and in human nature itself. Indeed, we must go further. In this sense faith in a scientific solution of human problems is integral to the substance of Christian faith, with its claim to ultimate rationality.

This, however, is, surely, not what is intended or understood by the exponents and adherents of the new scientific humanism, when they speak of a scientific solution of ethical problems. Behind this question of scientific resources and the possibilities which they open up there lies the implication or the assumption that man is, or contains within himself, the final measure of his own destinies. In other words, what is asserted is that man is autonomous and self-completing in respect of both the standard to which his conduct should be conformed and the end towards which that conduct should be directed.

Now the first thing to be said about this claim is that it is fundamentally unscientific, because it is in radical conflict with the substance of spiritual experience in a number of different spheres, including the sphere of morality itself. The evidence for the truth of this statement, so far as morality is concerned, lies in the whole history of moral philosophy. I fear, therefore, that the statement cannot receive detailed justification in this paper. I have endeavoured to deal with it more fully elsewhere. But there is a shorter way of meeting this kind of scientific humanism, which it may be worth while to mention.

The claim that the ultimate sanctions and foundations of

* *Icarus*.

† J. B. Haldane, *Dædalus*; B. Russell, *op. cit.*; Lippmann, *op. cit.*, etc.

morality can be determined by the empirical methods of science is a claim which is in conflict with the fundamental character of science itself. For science cannot determine its own rational foundations in thought. It is obliged to accept the givenness of rational thought and the brute facts of experience, and to work upon the materials so provided. Thus the scientific disciplines are not the ultimate arbiters over themselves, and cannot therefore reasonably lay claim to the rôle of arbiter over the ultimate data of the moral life. It is a curious feature of the present intellectual situation, that the scientific humanism which we are here criticizing should be claiming the functions of a dictator at a time when the physical sciences, which this humanism presupposes, are in process of abandoning that claim.

III

Let us turn to another question raised by the programme of the new morality—namely, its relation to religion. The new moralists here tend to fall apart. Whilst they are agreed in repudiating the necessity of theological presuppositions for the moral life, they are by no means unanimous in their attitude towards religion itself. There are those who would say that religion is evidently a source of consolation and inspiration to many people, and may therefore be recognized as exercising a valuable function in supplying the enthusiasm and hope which are necessary to moral progress. This concession, however, does not reinstate the religious sanctions. It does not concede that the ends of morality must be determined by reference to religious revelation. It merely allows that religion may enable a man to pursue ethical ends which are determined on other grounds.

We must not allow ourselves to fall into the trap which is here prepared for us. Under the guise of a friendly attitude towards religion there is concealed a determination that religion shall be made to serve a secular programme. The eager steeds of religious faith are to be hitched to the lumbering car of secular progress. In this way religion becomes a device for solving the problems of civilization. It is to be feared that many religious people have unconsciously travelled a long way towards accepting this view of the matter. If so, they are unwittingly playing into the hands of secularism.

For religion has, in fact, a very different account to give of itself. According to its own testimony the essence of religion lies in worship, in the adoring recognition of the Creator by His creatures. Nothing less than this will satisfy the religious impulse when it reaches mature expression. In its lower forms

—whether earlier in time, or later but retrograde in tendency—it has sometimes linked its fortunes with the pursuit of material happiness or subordinated its aims to the more immediate and apparent interests of civilization. But the issue of this surrender is seen in the long perspective of history to be detrimental to the higher interests of civilization itself, and to be ruinous to any religion which does not succeed in rising above such a level.

In the history of religions a contrasted and corrective principle comes into operation when the transcendent, other-worldly, supra-temporal reference of life receives recognition. Religion is now seen to imply the essential incompleteness of a purely earthly, secular, this-world goal of human conduct. It begins to bear witness to a kingdom of divine grace and love in which alone man is to find his completion and satisfaction, his true beatitude. All this is implied in the fundamental religious attitude of worship; and because it is so implied we must, I think, acknowledge that those who show an uncompromising hostility to religion in the interests of the new morality have a much clearer recognition of the issues at stake than those who would clip the wings of religious faith by making it serve an end not properly commensurate with the specific character of religion itself.

This hostile attitude is well illustrated in Freud's little book entitled *The Future of an Illusion*. Religion, it is argued, is an illusion, which has fed men with the comforts of an unreal world of fantasy, and which had best be swept away in the interests of the scientific spirit. For scientific knowledge, according to Freud, is reserved the task of liberating human life from the strain and tension set up by the conflict between natural forces and instincts on the one hand, and the tasks and duties of civilization on the other. The credentials of religion cannot be seriously assailed by such methods of argument as are employed in this book. But that is another question, with which we are not now immediately concerned. This paper is limited to moral issues. If we are looking for illusions it must be said that the grand illusion of all this class of literature, of which Freud's book is a specimen, consists in a fantasy-projection of a future earthly paradise in which the lambs of civilization will at last lie down securely beside the lions of nature with their sharp teeth and claws, the appetites and instincts.

I do not, however, propose to examine further the difficulties which the new morality is preparing for itself. Our present object is rather to fix as clearly as possible the issues of the new ethical conflict. We pass on, therefore, now to some characteristics of the Christian conception of life which appear to render that conflict inevitable.

IV

For Christian faith, human life and its natural environment in this visible universe belong to a vaster order, in many ways transcending our sensible experience, wholly dependent upon the creative will of God, and destined to find its fulfilment in Him. The goal of human life is, therefore, not in man himself, nor in human society as such, nor in the resources and treasures of this created order. To rest content in any of these things is idolatry. Created things, including human possibilities of enjoyment, spiritual as well as material, are all gifts of God, which are ours only as we make them His. They yield their mysterious treasures to us only so far as we render them back to God in the oblation of worship. We can truly enjoy them only so far as we enjoy God in them. The glory of man lies in that which he can offer to God, and therefore the goal of creation is to be attained through its consecration in worship.

Under this interpretation human life is a great deal more mysterious and more significant than can be supposed under any secular scheme of morality. Not only are the facts and powers of nature to be subordinated to human society in civilization, but both of these are to be conformed to the principles of that wider order of reality disclosed to us in religious revelation, that Kingdom of God which embraces the divine purposes for man and which comes to its fulfilment in worship. The heart of Christian faith lies present in the belief that this kingdom of heaven, wherein we have access to the Father in worship, has been opened to mankind by Christ our Lord; and again, that in Christ, and within the new fellowship made by Him, all the treasures of creation are capable of that transformation which is the indispensable condition for the disclosure of their true significance and their profitable use.

All ethical problems resolve themselves into the one great problem as to how the various tendencies in man, and the conflicting demands which they make, are to be co-ordinated into one unified harmony of co-operation commensurate with the greater demand of reality. All pleasures are in themselves good, because all are relevant to reality. But not all are relevant in the same degree and to the same extent, or without due relation to their place in a larger scheme. It is the function of experience and of social tradition to guide us through the mazes of this problem. Further, science with its precision and with its exact knowledge has the important and indispensable function of criticizing this process of moral education, of correcting its mistakes, and finally of instilling a new quality into the

process itself, a quality which is well summed up in Freud's phrase "education to reality."

In this process of education to reality we learn that no single tendency of our nature can be adequately fulfilled in isolation from, or disregard of, the total complex of life. The due integration of all tendencies within a harmony of the whole depends upon the direction and function of this complex whole which we call human nature. This question of direction and function, in turn, depends upon the character of the demand which reality makes upon us. Now the demand of reality for Christian faith is fundamentally different from that demand as interpreted in any secular programme of morality. This divergence is equally pronounced as regards the possibility of our conformity with the demand. For any secular scheme must rely simply upon man's achievement, upon his capacity for conformity to the ethical code which he sets before himself. Whereas for Christian faith ethical achievement is a response to divine grace, a humble co-operation with the vast resources of the living God, displayed in activities of omnipotent love.

This radical divergence with regard to ultimate facts and in respect of man's relation to those facts creates an unbridgeable gulf between the two contrasted conceptions of morality, not simply as to details here and there, but as to every single element in the structure of the moral life. A moment's reflection will serve to show the inevitable truth of this conclusion. The deepest ethical divergences are to be traced not to a specific difference in the class of actions performed, but rather to a difference as to motives and as to the whole governing purpose of life. The glutton and the drunkard, the sensualist and the miser, gratify the same instincts as decent people who eat, drink, marry, earn and spend money, own property, and so forth. Yet the latter make a whole range of similar actions the basis of a higher type of life. Natural satisfactions which are incidentally the same in kind enter into deeply divergent courses of conduct. This illustration may serve to indicate the possibility of a much more subtle and intangible divergence of spiritual aims operating within a common social tradition, and despite a large measure of agreement as to the actual details of right conduct.

The difference, however, between a high secular morality and the Christian interpretation of the conduct of life is not (as in the above illustration) a difference between bad and good, but between two kinds of good. The real point at issue between them is the question as to which of the two is most inclusive of all the relevant facts. There is much common ground; for both are handling the same materials and both are seeking to

interpret the same needs of human nature. The Christian claim is, first, that all the interests and values for which the rival moralist is contending can be brought to their fulfilment in the Christian way of life, and in no other way with a like degree of adequacy; secondly, that the deepest interests and values are not provided for in the rival programme at all, and that, consequently, every secular solution of particular problems in morality, just in so far as it is secular, is radically deficient and at variance with the demand of reality.

V

From their own standpoint the new moralists have shown a keen perception of the fundamental issue by their repudiation of the theological reference in Christian ethics. Their quarrel is not with the principle of disinterestedness, as it has been called. A scientific humanism is bound to recognize that principle, and with it the subordination of private to public interest, of self to society, of immediate gratification to higher and more social forms of happiness. They may even imagine, as apparently Mr. Walter Lippmann does, that the principle of disinterested action is the sum of all ethical wisdom and the essence of religion.* All this, however, does not make them at one with Christianity. The unbridgeable gulf remains.

For to what are they surrendering themselves in conforming to this principle? Do they believe that at the heart of reality there pulsates a law of selfless love? If they really believe this, then there can be small point in their repudiation of religious sanctions. For they are so far submitting their conduct of life to that which the Christian calls God. Some of them, however, have expressly repudiated this interpretation of their meaning. The "free man's worship" then becomes the worship of human ideals, of human virtue, or of the higher human interests, according to the point of view from which we regard it. It is a surrender of man to the best of which he is capable or to the true welfare of society as he sees it. That is no mean thing compared with other possible choices. But we must not permit ourselves to be deceived by this unquestionable fact. It is, and must remain, a cult of human values; and no matter how high those values stand, theirs is a relative good, relative to the horizon of human interests.

So in the last resort this principle of disinterestedness is not disinterested. Our quarrel with it, however, is not on that score. For the doctrine that right conduct is rewarded is rooted in the Gospels. No, our quarrel must be put on another ground

* Lippmann, *op. cit.* pp. 204, 327.

—namely, that the final and determining interests are the wrong ones. The final good of man is here sought in man and through man, in human goods and through human achievements. This doctrine, which may have in it so much of the spirit of religion, so much of its reverent temper, none the less misses the point of religion, the point in which true religion both embraces the moral life and yet surpasses it.

And here is the point. The highest good of man lies not in himself nor in anything human, but beyond himself, beyond man; not in his own achievement, but in a divine achievement which comes to meet his need and to supply his want, to carry him beyond the possibilities which he can envisage for himself. The highest good of man lies not in himself, but beyond himself. If that good is the Absolute Good, then we may worship it, but not otherwise. And if that good has been revealed to us in a perfect human life, as the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation declares, then we can recognize and understand, embrace it and bow before it in a rational worship. And if, further, that good has been communicated to us so as to become the inward law of our spiritual existence, then we can have fellowship with the gracious Being by whom that communicated good has been imparted, and thus possess inward illumination for the guidance of life through all the maze of competing relative goods which are offered to us.

It is thus that we can humbly claim to possess a key to the principles of human integrity, a standard by which we can weigh the alternative courses set before us in ever new forms, as science transforms the proximate and relative conditions of our earthly life. It does not, however, follow that on the ground of this high advantage the solution of ethical problems is easier for the Christian believer than for others. If for us human life is both more mysterious and more significant, then we might expect that the solution will often be more difficult. Moral decision will be for us not less but more costly; for there is more at stake. For us man is set upon a background of eternity, and therefore *omnia exeunt in mysterium*. On Christian principles many of the current solutions of pressing ethical problems will be judged to be superficial, because they do not go down to the roots of human need. For others those same solutions will seem obvious and inevitable, because appropriate to the ends which they have set before themselves, those ends being not such as Christian faith can endorse.

But the issues will not always be as straightforward as this. Even for those who share Christian principles there will be legitimate room for difference of moral judgment—not that both opinions will in all such cases prove to be in the end right,

or equally so, but rather because it is only under such conditions of free judgment and free mutual criticism that all tests of reason and experience can be applied—that morality can become a matter of whole-hearted personal assent to the good life. The New Testament does not encourage us to suppose that there must be one clear and certain answer to every new moral problem which arises; nor can any system of authority, however imposing, provide detailed guidance which could be adequate to the actual complexities of life. As in other fields of life, so also in the Christian Church, corporate experience, social tradition, and the wisdom of trained experts, are all of the highest importance for the solution of problems in the moral life. But the value of these authorities will depend largely upon the fact that none of them are immune from criticism, and that none of them has necessarily said the last word.

L. S. THORNTON, C.R.

THE VATICAN COUNCIL*

WHEN Dom Butler published his *Life of Bishop Ullathorne* it was seen that the learned editor of the *Lausiac History* and exponent of Benedictine monachism was also a delightful and discriminating biographer. His new work is based on Bishop Ullathorne's letters, but in scope goes far beyond them, and the result has considerable importance. The literature connected with the Vatican Council of 1870 is already so enormous in mere bulk that any addition to it requires justification. It is true that the historical student, unless his purpose is a survey of opinion, whether well- or ill-informed, may feel himself entitled to set on one side a good deal of it as having no special claim to attention; for much is ephemeral rather than permanent, tendentious rather than critical, and descriptions by persons who were not present of incidents which did not occur have less interest, when once this is established, than the curate of Portsmouth's account of the comely proportions of the son of Philip and Mary. There are, indeed, some subsidiary materials that cannot possibly be neglected, because of the influence they have exercised. Dom Butler goes too far when he says that "in England, educated public opinion has hitherto been formed wholly on Janus, Quirinus, Pomponio Leto, all promptly translated into English, and on the letters of Acton

* *The Vatican Council*. The story told from inside in Bishop Ullathorne's Letters. By Dom Cuthbert Butler, Monk of Downside Abbey. Two volumes. Longmans, 1930. 25s. net.

and of Mozley, the correspondent of *The Times*"; but, in respect of the extent to which it is true, it is fair to ask: Whose fault is that? There were many points in regard to which Manning was in a far better position to know the facts than Acton, but Manning had only himself to thank if his version was received by his own countrymen not merely with hesitation but with frank incredulity. There is one elaborate pamphlet, not included in those enumerated, that entitled *Ce qui se passe au Concile*, which was stigmatized by the five Presidents of the Council as "full of calumnies and disgraceful falsehoods"; while Emile Ollivier wrote that "this clear, impassioned, often eloquent writing has few material errors; nearly all its facts are official, or taken from the infallibilist journals: but for all that, it is a libel rather than a history, a travesty not a story." It was condemned on July 16, 1870, yet on May 21 Mgr. Darboy, Archbishop of Paris, had written to the Emperor Napoleon III.: "Les détails qu'on pourrait y ajouter sont de nature à confirmer ces révélations si tristes, et à fortifier l'impression pénible qui en résulte"; and Dom Butler says of it that, "being free from the bitter and extravagant partisanship of Quirinus, it is probably the most serious indictment of the Council." We are not quite clear why he omits from his own succinct account of the chief primary and secondary authorities the work of C. H. Plantier, Bishop of Nîmes; but anyone who, putting aside for the time the works of historical survey in which the Vatican Council is treated in its setting as part of general European history, devotes himself to the amazing collection of documents, nearly 900 in number, in Cecconi and the *Collectio Lacensis* (especially the diplomatic correspondence in the latter) will understand a little better why the Council loomed gigantic in the imagination of friend and foe at least on the Continent. Few could achieve the air of detachment with which the Œcumenical Patriarch, without lifting his eyes, motioned with his hand for the papal envoy at Constantinople to put the letter of invitation down on the sofa, and with a like gesture at the end of the interview signed to the protosyncellus to hand it back. We may smile at the envoy's account to Cardinal Barnabò both of what happened and of what he told the Armenian Patriarch had happened, and of how he satisfied the latter that the documents "legate con lusso in marocchino rosso" were authentic, but the sections in the appendix to the *Collectio Lacensis*, headed "Animorum motus in Gallia" or "in Germania," tell a story which is serious indeed.

The vividness of a cleverly written despatch cannot, of course, be expected in the formal records of the Council, but the painful effort with which the student will plough his way

through the five folio volumes of Mansi's *Concilia* which enshrine them will not have been wholly wasted if long before he reaches the last of the 6,000 columns certain reflections suggest themselves which, though they may be of quite a prosaic kind, may at least contribute something to understanding the course of events in the Council itself; and the illumination that it affords in this respect is one of the many merits of Dom Butler's book, which incidentally clears away, it may be hoped once for all, many misconceptions, and notably in regard to what are not matters of opinion, but of ascertainable fact.

First in regard to numbers. At the first general Congregation on December 10, 1869, 679 persons were present out of 1,000 possible. At the second public session on January 6, 1870, "close on 750 responded." Dom Butler's analysis of this number shows that "580 were diocesan bishops with full status as ordinaries; 60 were vicars apostolic exercising episcopal jurisdiction, often in large and important districts; 10 were coadjutors; 36 were mere titulars; 64 were not bishops" (including 23 Cardinals in Curia, and 41 superiors of Religious Orders). Two days later "ihr sehr ergebener Arnim" was writing to Döllinger in relation to a petition of 500 Fathers for infallibility to be declared (it was really 450), that Catholicism in Germany could not be legislated for by 500 Italians, of whom 300 were papal pensioners (von 500 Italienern, unter denen 300 Kostgänger des Papstes sind). Whether the voice be that of Count Arnim or of "Quirinus," whose language is similar, the imputation is quite unworthy, and the calculation, as anyone may judge who dissects the lists, absolutely wrong. The Vatican decrees would have been a much less serious matter if it had in fact been possible to represent them with truth as a victory of Italian-born bishops over the representatives of the rest of Roman Catholic Christendom. Dom Butler calculates that in January, 1870, the minority could reasonably have counted on some 200 opposed to the definition: his analysis of the nations of those openly opposed in January and July shows that in each case there were included only seven Italians and no Spaniards, whether from the Peninsula or from South America. That is all that can be said.

The problem of large numbers carries with it serious practical difficulties in regard to the conduct of business. It was easy enough to provide in St. Peter's an "aula" with seats numbered 1 to 900, and to do so without detracting from the majesty of the building; what was not easy, and seemed, indeed, for several weeks to present almost insuperable difficulties, was improvement of the acoustic properties of the aula when provided. Again, if useful work is to be done by so large an assembly,

there must be a good deal of preparatory, co-ordinating, and revision work done by committees. Dom Butler points out that "the postulations for subjects to be brought on, submitted by the bishops to the Congregation *de postulatis*, run to 330 columns of Mansi . . . and that they range freely over the entire field of faith, morals, discipline, canon law, relations of Church and State, and practical devotional life"; and adds: "It will easily be seen that some control of the kind was necessary." Nor will anyone with any real experience doubt that a certain amount of management will be necessary as to the manner and the order in which business is brought forward. Eighty-six general Congregations and four public sessions were held in 211 days; the average length of a Congregation was about four hours, though the time was even lengthened towards the end from 8 a.m. to 1.15 p.m., and meetings of committees were sometimes protracted almost to the limit of endurance. As to the speeches, many of the Fathers took an unconscionable time to "pass to the Deluge," and few had the humour of the titular successor of St. Polycarp, who ended at last by saying "Cedant verba tintinnabulo." Once only was the closure applied (on June 3, 1870), thus excluding forty bishops who had proposed to speak; but as Dom Butler points out, "sixty-five had spoken, thirty-five in favour of the definition, twenty-six against. The debate had gone on during fifteen Congregations of some four hours each, and the speeches cover just over four hundred columns of Mansi." The bishop who wrote a month later (July 2), "We are being crushed under the twofold burden of heat and of eloquence," had good reason on his side. On July 11 Mgr. Gasser of Brixen spoke for nearly four hours to fill twenty-seven columns of the report. That might be justified, for he was spokesman for the deputation *De Fide*, but Mansi also contains a speech as long which Archbishop Kenrick of St. Louis had prepared, but mercifully printed without delivery. It is clear that at many Congregations four or five speeches only were possible. "I envy the Hungarian bishops," wrote Bishop Ullathorne, "their facility in speaking Latin, which they are so accustomed to that they talk as easily as if they were chattering the language of the country." In regard to the definition, Dom Butler points out that they were a solid "Non placet." Six months later Bishop Ullathorne says: "The shrewdest man in the Council is a young bishop from California, a native of Spain, but brought up in America . . . he never speaks above a few minutes, but he hits the nail on the head invariably. He neither argues nor talks, but simply proposes amendments in the text and comes down again." In contrast is another Spaniard who "spoke . . . fifteen columns in favour of the

definition, without putting in any amendment and without any discussion of the text." The charisma of silence is seldom so highly valued as it deserves, and that of patience is not too common an episcopal endowment. Dr. Ullathorne could solace himself "whilst a drowsy speech was going on" by reading forty pages octavo of one scheme of questions to be proposed to the Council; and later Dom Butler notes that the analytic synopsis of the observations of the bishops on the schema *De Fide* "covers just 200 columns of Mansi, and the observations number 600." On April 30 Ullathorne wrote: "The great question is fairly launched out, on paper at least. Yesterday was distributed a folio of 104 pp. containing, abridged, the proposed amendments sent in by Fathers on the Supremacy of the Vicar of Christ. To-day was distributed another folio of 242 pp. containing in abridgement the proposals with their arguments of 132 Fathers, or groups of Fathers, on the question of Infallibility." And Dom Butler's judgement is entitled to respect when he speaks of the impression left by reading the speeches of the "crucial debate," which is "above all the patience of the Fathers and the forbearance of the Presidents." In Ullathorne's view "the two classes who best succeed in holding attention are those accustomed to public meetings, and those who have been theological professors." On May 1 he wrote: "I have never witnessed the least ill-feeling manifested between any two bishops who have spoken even the most strongly against each other's views from the ambo. And you see those who are considered the leading antagonists on even the gravest points, talking as cheerily with each other, and having their pleasant jokes, as those who are the most closely allied in sentiments. Clever and learned bishops see the whole fabric of their thoughts, efforts, and aspirations for months, perhaps years, in course of preparation, swept away by a few words from the exposition of a special deputation, which throw the great majority on the opposite side in voting; and yet you never see them changed in their manner, or showing any sign of discontent or impatience. It is certainly a most edifying assemblage, and tends to prove the maxim that bishops are in the state of perfection."

This is the sober-tempered estimate of a kindly man who, if he stood aloof deliberately from the cabals and manœuvres and discussions which went on outside the aula of the Council, was not without knowledge of them, and had a shrewd judgement of their character. Yet as one reads, it is with the sense that it would be difficult to find any statement more widely at variance with the conventional estimate of the Vatican Council. Is the one wholly true and the other wholly false, or does the

truth lie somewhere in between? It is another of the merits of Dom Butler's book that it goes far to help the student to answer the question, and certainly a dispassionate judgment ought to be possible after the lapse of sixty years.

The evidence of correspondence, controversial pamphlets, and memoirs clearly suggests that from an early stage in the proceedings at least a considerable minority of the bishops were under the impression that they were unlikely to receive fair consideration for their views. It seems puerile to us now that anyone should ever have supposed that the bad acoustic properties of the aula were part of a deep-laid plot, instead of being due to mismanagement and inadequate preparation. And it may be doubted if the tactics which Mgr. Manning and his friends considered consonant with the character of a Christian bishop and a gentleman were so successful in determining the earlier course of the proceedings as was supposed; indeed, it may be argued that they tended to protract it by evoking opposition. As regards the definition of infallibility, it must be remembered that even if it seems to us now almost incredible that anyone could have thought that the raising of the question at the Council could be avoided, there seems at least some ground for saying that it was the suspicion of unfairness and "slimness" which soon crystallized doubts and fears into a definite "opposition" of a kind which produced manœuvres and counter-manœuvres. Such proceedings could only be detrimental to the prestige both of individuals and of the Council. It may be hard, perhaps impossible, to determine how Newman's private letter, with its reference to the activities of an "aggressive insolent faction," came to be put into circulation without his consent, but again it is necessary to remind ourselves that the "infallibilists" had a strength not merely of solidarity in numbers but of conviction which their opponents could hardly claim, and certainly did not possess. The point is one of most material importance for its bearing upon the character and good faith of those who later submitted themselves. In a striking passage at the opening of his chapter "After the Council," Dom Butler says: "I have been met with the question: 'What! Do you say it was right for these bishops to go against their intellectual convictions?' Yes, surely; that is what it is to be a Catholic: when the teaching Church finally and formally declares a belief to be an article of Catholic Faith, it is the part of every Catholic to give up private judgement and accept the judgement of the Church that the doctrine is part of the divine revelation." To judge the definition of a doctrine inopportune is quite consistent with holding the doctrine itself as a private opinion. That, indeed,

is the position of Newman at the time when he wrote the letter of Jan. 28, 1870 (published in the *Standard* on April 6), already quoted. Those who took the same view and were members of the Council, as Newman was not, might with perfect reasonableness and without loss of self-respect accept the judgment of their brethren that they were mistaken in judging inopportune the definition of a doctrine which in fact they themselves already believed. But Newman had written also: "I look with anxiety at the prospect of having to defend decisions which may not be difficult to my [own] private judgement, but may be most difficult to maintain logically in the face of historical facts." And in the very remarkable letter to the Emperor (January 26, 1870) Archbishop Darboy spoke of the counter-petition sent to the Pope by about 150 bishops of every country except Spain, "à l'effet d'obtenir, qu'il veuille bien ne pas laisser poser une telle question, à cause des difficultés théologiques, historiques et politiques dont elle est hérissée." Again, many of these bishops no doubt felt that they were following the dictates of a higher Authority when they submitted after the decision had gone the other way. It is conventional to speak in depreciatory terms of Pope Pius IX., and yet it is impossible to read contemporary documents, later memoirs of individual bishops, and other works down to Dom Butler's own without feeling that regard for his personality enhanced the difficulty of those who opposed what it was absurd to pretend not to know that he fully believed. In one sense, indeed, the whole position had been conceded when he was allowed to proclaim the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin. It was then that the real innovation was made, not in the form adopted for the decrees of the Council of 1870 or in the language of the definition of infallibility. If the Pope was not clever nor learned, he was at least consistent, and the historical student may find it easier to regard with respect a man who without argument views himself as the present living embodiment of tradition than those theologians who play fast and loose with history or treat the appeal to it as irrelevant, if not heretical. He may find it also wiser to admire than to complain of the discretion which has omitted so far to supply an authoritative list of pronouncements in the past for which the quality of infallibility is claimed; for such a list would probably be highly embarrassing to everyone except the professional controversialist, and especially to those who from any but the curialist point of view set before their minds the reunion of Christendom. The chapter "De Romani Pontificis infallibili magisterio" is a much more careful and skilful document than it is commonly represented as being

by those who attempt from any side to represent or summarize it in a sentence. Within certain limits it is patient of more than one interpretation, but that latitude has limits and does not alter the fact that the central conception is either true or, as is judged by those who do not belong to the Roman obedience, is evolved from an exegesis of Scripture which is erroneous in combination with a reading of history which is false. Either is perfectly consistent with complete interior good faith. It is the mark of the genuine student in the field of history or of natural science that he is always ready to reconsider his conclusions in the light of fresh evidence, and, being modest, he may hesitate in any case to regard his conclusions as more than tentative. But such as they are they present the best judgment that he can form by the light that is given to him, and that is their value in the eyes of his fellow-students, whether as the result of their own investigations they agree with him or differ from him. And here a very interesting problem arises. At least in the estimation of historical students the three most learned historians in the Roman Church at the time of the Vatican Council were Hefele, Döllinger, and Acton. All of them were opposed to the idea of the definition for reasons which went far beyond the view that it was inopportune, but only one of them (Hefele) was a member of the Council. As such he was in a position of peculiar responsibility and difficulty, and if, when he finally submitted, he could write that the act by which he "was able, by submitting" himself "frankly to the highest authority of the Church, to reconcile" himself "to the decree of the Council" had given him back "interior peace," he may well seem to deserve sympathy rather than criticism. But as he reads Dom Butler's story, told with characteristic candour, it may be doubted if sympathy will be the student's dominant feeling in other directions. Hefele, says the writer, "seems to have been the bishop who found the greatest difficulty in accepting the definition of the infallibility. Yet he did not want much; it was the old bugbear of the apparent 'separate' infallibility that scared him. 'If it were declared that before any definition the Pope must consult the Church in the manner most suitable for the particular case, one could reconcile oneself to the infallibility'; so he said in a letter to Döllinger. He thought of resigning his diocese. His clergy grew restive at his hesitation, and began to ask if he had incurred excommunication. Rome was bringing silent pressure to bear, by withholding dispensations he applied for in marriage cases. However, after a severe mental conflict, he published the decrees to his diocese, and wrote to the Nuncio his acceptance, April, 1871. It must not

be supposed that the submission of faith came automatically or easily to men like Hefele, or Haynald, or Förster, or Strossmayer, or Schwarzenberg. There was a period of hesitation and interior struggle and conflict, that had to be battled through, before Catholic principle came out victorious over private judgement. A similar battle, the struggle between the spirit and the flesh, has to be fought out in every life over temptations of one kind or another."

It would be difficult indeed to find a more characteristic statement of the official Roman attitude in its pettiness as well as its dominance, and it is something quite different from discourtesy which compels those who dissent from it to claim that the principle thus enunciated may deserve almost any epithet more readily than "Catholic." Hefele submitted, Döllinger did not, and after nine months was formally excommunicated, having declared in vehement terms that "as Christian, as theologian, as historian, as citizen" he could not accept this doctrine. To contend that the doctrine carried in the minds of the Pope and the Council all the implications that Döllinger placed upon it would have been easier sixty years ago in the height of controversy than it would be now. The most brilliant portion of Dom Butler's book is the study of Gallicanism and Neo-ultramontanism, and the reader of that study will probably form an idea at least approximating to truth of the way in which it came about that a weapon was forged which is chiefly useful so long as it is not used. That was certainly not the desire of those who had the largest share in the work, by which we do not mean those who contributed the larger number of columns to Mansi. But how great is the difficulty that has been created anyone may judge who turns from a careful examination of the definition to a consideration of the task that would lie before the theologians if it were desired to elevate the doctrine of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary from the status of "a probable opinion which it is impious to deny" into an article of faith. This does not mean that the task would be found impossible of achievement, and doubtless there would not be wanting some to "work hard and cleverly" to secure it, but it is not easy to see how the conditions could be satisfied.

Dom Butler's volumes abound in character sketches, many of them of great interest, and are adorned with numerous photographs. His judgment is always equable, if at times severe; and if he had it in mind to enable students to do fuller justice to Bishop Ullathorne, he has certainly succeeded in that as well as in giving them a work of which every later writer on the Vatican Council will feel bound to make use.

CLAUDE JENKINS.

THE ORIGINS OF THE EPISCOPATE: A POSTSCRIPT

IN my Essay on the Origins of the Episcopate in the volume *Episcopacy Ancient and Modern* (1930) I collected, in a summarized form and imperfectly, the evidence for the Jewish origin of the Christian Ministry, including the Episcopate. What I did briefly, Mr. Lockton has done with virtual completeness in his admirable work *Divers Orders of Ministers*, which appeared almost simultaneously.* Neither of us noticed a piece of evidence which provides a kind of coping-stone for our theory. Yet so long ago as 1913 a few words used by Dr. Charles in his *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha* (ii. 824) gave the clue required. In his Commentary on "Fragments of a Zadokite Work" he says of the "Censor" of the sect there described: "This official . . . corresponded . . . to the ἐπίσκοπος of the early Christians." The following note works out the hint thus given.

Dr. Charles held that the book was written towards the end of the first century B.C. It describes the life of a sect, "the sons of Zadok," which arose out of a religious revival at Jerusalem during 196 to 176 B.C. The reformers eventually separated themselves from their brethren of the priesthood and settled at Damascus. From that city as a centre they conducted a missionary movement in Palestine. Their subsequent history is unknown; probably many of them joined the Christian Church. Compare Acts vi. 7, which tells of the priests who became obedient unto the faith.

Recent writers have added a good deal to the conclusions of S. Schechter in the *editio princeps* and of Dr. Charles.† The "Zadokite Work" is now thought to rest upon Pharisaic tradition. The Damascus-sect was a definitely circumscribed body, with its orders of priests, Levites, Israelites, and proselytes. Admission was strictly regulated. The head of the Community was called a "Censor." Smaller groups, or "camps," existed. The sect claimed to be the people of the New Covenant (cf. Jeremiah xxxi. 30) and to be the *hābhūrā* of Israel, the (true) community or brotherhood of Israel. (Compare the inscription on Maccabæan coins—"hbhr of the Jews.")

This is very interesting, since it shows that the way was prepared for the claim of the Christian Church to be the faithful remnant, the true people of God. Indeed Our Lord and His

* A review of the book is in preparation.

† Their views are summarized by J. Jeremias, *Jerusalem zur Zeit Jesu*, ii. B., 130 ff. (1929). See Hölcher's article in *Zeitschrift für die N.T. liche Wissenschaft*, 1929, pp. 21-46; and G. F. Moore, *Judaism*, i. 201-204.

disciples would have seemed just such another reforming sect of Judaism. But the point with which we are here concerned is the single "monarchical" head of the sect. He is called the *mēbhaqqēr*, or "censor" in Dr. Charles' translation. But *episcopos* is a closer rendering. In my Essay, referred to above, I showed the great influence of Ezekiel xxxiv. on the primitive conception of a Bishop. The Hebrew word is used there of metaphorical shepherding. "I will search for my sheep and will seek them out (*biqqartim*). As a shepherd seeketh out (*bāqqārāt*) his flock" (vv. 11, 12). The LXX rendering of "will seek them out" is ἐπισκέψομαι, the verb of which ἐπίσκοπος is the noun. This may seem a verbal point of small importance until one asks how the Damascus-sect would have described their chief officer in speaking to Greek neighbours. Almost certainly they would have called him *episcopos*.

The Syriac Didascalia lays great stress on Ezekiel xxxiv. in its description of the Bishop's functions. We must therefore consult its pages to see whether any of the "censor's" qualifications and duties reappear in that early Church Manual. The parallels now to be given are convincing, but even without them the Censor seems familiar.

ZADOKITE WORK

(Charles' translation)

xvi. 1. "The Censor of the camp . . . shall instruct the many in the works of God, and shall make them understand His wondrous mighty acts, and shall narrate before them the things of the world since its creation.

2. "And he shall have mercy upon them as a father upon his children, and shall forgive all that have incurred guilt.

3. "As a shepherd with his flock he shall loose all the bonds of their knots (*or*, of his binding*) . . . the oppressed and crushed in his congregation.

4-6. "And everyone who joins his congregation, he shall reckon him according to his works, his

SYRIAC DIDASCALIA

(Connolly's edition)

IV (ii. 5). The Bishop is to "interpret and expound the Scriptures."

VI (ii. 13). The Bishop is to judge, receiving the sinner "with mercy and compassion, when he promises to repent."

Ezek. xxxiv. is quoted. Cf. Matt. xvi. 19 for "binding and loosing."

XII (ii. 58). Regulations about visitors, etc.

* So later writers on the subject.

understanding, his might, his strength, and his wealth. And they shall record him in his place in accordance with his position in a lot of the camp. No man of the children of the camp shall bring a man into the congregation without the word of the Censor of the camp."

7. Intercourse with Gentiles regulated by the Censor.

xvii. 6-8. "The Censor who is over all the camp shall be from thirty years old even unto fifty years old, a master in every counsel of men and in every tongue. According to his word shall come in those who enter the congregation, every man in his own order. And as regards any matter on which it shall be incumbent for any man to speak, he shall speak to the Censor in regard to any suit or cause."

xviii. 1. "The wages of two days every month is the rule. And they shall give it into the hands of the Censor and the judges."

3-5. He is to give to the poor, needy, aged, vagrant, captives, virgins.

It should be remembered that these Zadokite fragments were first published in 1910, so that they were unknown to the writers of the classical English books on the Ministry. It is clear that they reveal a sect, otherwise unknown, with many affinities to primitive Christianity. The point here emphasized is that when such a sect arose and organized itself apart from the Temple at Jerusalem it adopted institutions of a type that can fairly be termed episcopal and even monarchical-episcopal.

XI (ii. 46 ff). The Bishop as judge.

IV (ii. 1). "Not less than fifty years old . . . [a younger man is allowed in a small congregation] . . . Let him be instructed and apt to teach; but if he know not letters, let him be versed and skilled in the word."

XII (ii. 57). "In your congregation . . . appoint the places for the brethren with care and gravity."

Roughly equivalent to tithes.

IX (ii. 27). "Present your offerings to the Bishop, either you yourselves, or through the deacons."

IV (ii. 4). "Let him love the orphans with the widows, and be a lover of the poor and of strangers." Cf. VIII (ii. 25).

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

READERS of THEOLOGY will have read with great satisfaction of the appointment of Dr. Mozley to the canonry at St. Paul's, vacant through the death of Canon Newbolt. Dr. Mozley has been, and we hope will continue to be, a frequent contributor to this journal ever since it started; and his profound learning and wise judgment have been of the greatest service to Anglican divinity and to the Church as a whole.

In view of the large amount of space given in this number to a particular moral issue, we hope that careful attention will be given to Fr. Thornton's article on the principles underlying the present situation in ethics.

We must add a word of personal regard to the brief tribute published below to the late Dean of Winchester. As our readers know, he contributed frequently to THEOLOGY on a variety of subjects, and he reviewed *Analecta Bollandiana* for us each quarter in these columns. From the inception of our task as Editor, we have had no better or more encouraging helper. He has been called "the foremost man of letters in the Church of England"; and alike by the variety of his interests and sympathies, and by the versatility of his pen, he had surely earned the title. The obituary notices in *The Times* and in the *Church Times* gave admirable impressions of his lovable personality. The combination of brilliant wit with loyal and effervescent affectionateness and serious piety is too rare a thing for his friends ever to forget; and they will follow him, as he would wish, with their continuous prayers.

IN MEMORIAM

WILLIAM HOLDEN HUTTON, DEAN OF WINCHESTER, 1919-1930

To a very wide circle of Oxford men, and many others, the news of the passing of William Holden Hutton, Dean of Winchester, comes as a shock, bringing a feeling of personal loss. Not a few members of St. John's College count his friendship amongst the treasures of their happy years at the University. Hutton had a wonderful gift of making friends with undergraduates, and none who came in contact with him could resist the charm of his perfect courtesy and unfailing thoughtfulness. To the outside world the Dean is known as a brilliant writer of many historical studies and the reviewer of hundreds of books, but to those who knew him at Oxford he stands out most clearly as a friend, and upon this friendship we now look back with gratitude. If it gave us pleasure, we know it gave him pleasure too. "Among all the things," he wrote once, "that a busy life has left in mind that are deeply to be regretted there has certainly not been one hour that I have spent with my 'men,' in work or in companionship, that I would not spend again. Their kindness and sympathy has been the great happiness of my life."

Nor did he forget us when we left Oxford. A very real anxiety to be of service in the new spheres of work opening before us, words of counsel

and cheer in later years as we entered on difficult tasks, letters of appreciation and encouragement as he tried to penetrate experiences other than his own—these and many other manifestations of his powers of sympathy made William Holden Hutton to those who knew him a striking and beautiful example of Christian friendship, the world's great need.

We shall not forget him, now that he has passed over, nor will he forget us. Can we not almost hear him say again, in those soft melodious tones of his, the words he once addressed to his friends? "You will know that I mean it with all my heart when I say that the message I most wish to send in return is that:

"I count myself in nothing else so happy
"As in a soul remembering my good friends."

R. D. MIDDLETON.

CORRESPONDENCE

SIR,

May I correct some of Prebendary Morgan's statements on pp. 279-280 in your current number, which give a false impression about the Old Catholic churches?

"A Church in Holland which had developed in 1723 as the result of the Pope's condemnation of Jansenism." The separation of the see of Utrecht (the only ancient see in Holland) from Rome was due to the refusal of the Pope to allow the consecration of the priest elected by the Chapter, because the Jesuits wanted to do away with the bishopric. The Chapter of Utrecht was ready to reject the "Five Propositions" condemned by the Pope, but would not condemn them as Jansen's, on the ground that they were not to be found in his writings. See Neale, *History of the So-called Jansenist Church of Holland*.

"The movement is strongest in Holland, but there are parishes in Switzerland and some activity in other European countries."

There are twenty-seven parishes in Holland, and over 10,000 people. In the German bishopric there are 106 centres where services are held: 38 of these have resident priests: the total number of Old Catholics in Germany is about 50,000. In the Swiss bishopric there are forty-two parishes (most of which have resident priests), and about 30,000 people. According to the most recent figures, there are over 34,000 people in the Austrian bishopric, and the number is growing steadily. In the Czechoslovak bishopric there are twelve parishes with a large number of out-stations. There is also an Old Catholic church in Croatia, and another among the Poles in the United States, with four bishops, 80,000 people, and a branch with its own bishop in Poland.

Full information may be obtained from the Altkatholischer Kalender for 1931 (from which most of the above statements are taken), published by the Willibrord-Buchhandlung, Talstrasse 52, Freiburg-in-Breisgau, Germany, or from the Swiss Old Catholic Haus-Kalender.

Your obedient servant,

C. BEAUFORT MOSS

(Hon. Sec., Society of St. Willibrord for the Reunion
of the Anglican and Old Catholic Churches).

ST. BONIFACE COLLEGE,
WARMINSTER, WILTS.
November 12, 1930.

LAMBETH CONFERENCE REVIEWS

II. (a) AND (b).—THE LIFE AND WITNESS OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY: MARRIAGE AND SEX

THE resolutions in regard to questions of sex and marriage, and the corresponding report in so far as it throws light on the resolutions, possess very great importance. So far as the indissolubility of marriage is concerned there is little which advances the thought or will change the practice of the Church. The indissolubility of marriage, as was natural, is again affirmed. If the argument for this, and for a Western rather than an Eastern interpretation, was already overwhelming, recent work has served to strengthen it. Dr. Lowther Clarke, supported by Dr. Gavin, has advanced evidence for the view that the Matthean exception had reference to marriages within forbidden degrees of affinity and not to adultery. In any case the primary authority of the second Gospel stands stronger than ever. Criticism is easier, and will be more common, of the fact that while the Church's blessing is refused to the remarriage even of the "innocent party," provision is contemplated for the admission to communion of an innocent party who has remarried, and that apparently without requiring separation. This much, however, may be said in defence. What is contemplated is simply that while the Anglican Church clearly affirms the indissolubility of marriage (and this in such a sense as to repudiate the Eastern interpretation) it should not refuse communion, if its condemnation is disregarded and remarriage takes place, in the type of case in which a great branch of the Church would have sanctioned remarriage. Unless the Anglican Church is to claim infallibility for itself or for the West, this is, in view of the Eastern opinion, a not unreasonable attitude. However convinced we may be that the East is wrong on this matter, however much we may hope that closer contact with ourselves will mean that their view may be influenced by us (as in much else our views are and we hope will be increasingly influenced by them), yet in some sense the issue necessarily remains open while their present view persists. That the resulting position is, however, profoundly unsatisfactory cannot be denied. In effect it amounts to saying to the "innocent party": "We believe you ought not to remarry, indeed that you cannot do so without adultery, but if you come to another conclusion and do remarry we will condone your action." Such an attitude strains beyond measure both honesty of decision and loyalty.

In two other respects the position as to marriage is left in a very unsatisfactory condition. In the first place, there is no treatment of the problem as it affects the relation of Church and State. In a community which is very largely not Christian serious questions arise as to whether the State law as to divorce can or should be the law of the Church, and, in consequence, as to whether it might not be desirable to distinguish more sharply between civil marriage and marriage according to the Church's rite, making clear that in the latter case additional obligations are assumed. That problem arises especially, but by no means only, in the case of an established Church. In the second place, the question of "nullity" and of its possible grounds, and the question as to whether dispensations should not be possible (as in the Roman Church) in regard to certain prohibited degrees of affinity, are neither of them advanced.

Again, the "Pauline privilege" is presenting a more real problem now that an increasing number of persons are withholding their children from baptism. Further, the question has to be faced as to whether, when the problem is apostasy rather than original unbelief, the spirit and any possible rationale of the Pauline privilege might not involve an extension of the "privilege" to cover this. In all these cases mere adoption of the Roman rules and practice is almost certainly not desirable, but quite certainly some definite rules, and some machinery for applying those rules, are urgently required.

It is abundantly clear that these questions can ill brook ten years' delay (and that all which can be done before the next Lambeth Conference by way of careful consideration and provisional action is eminently desirable), but it was inevitable that the available time should be taken up fully by the issue in this field which was faced, on which a decision modifying the traditional teaching was reached, and which it is difficult to deny was the most urgent. The whole problem presented by contraceptives, or rather by an increased knowledge and use of contraceptives, is exceedingly important. It is important in regard to "hard cases," but it had become even more important in other directions. Contraceptives are certainly being widely used to prevent conception in circumstances in which it cannot be maintained that conception is undesirable save for reasons which are selfish or unworthy. Further, the Church's insistence on the duty of procreation (and on the grave sin which is involved in any neglect of this duty) has been greatly weakened and obscured, to an extent seldom realized, by its being bound up with a condemnation of the use of contraceptives so absolute as to secure its rejection by the consciences even of many church-people. That is a difficulty which must be faced if in fact an absolute condemnation of contraceptives is necessary and right; but it afforded very grave reason for the reconsideration of this issue.

The Lambeth Conference of 1930 has condemned absolutely any attempt to combine intercourse with the avoidance of conception unless there is a clearly felt obligation to avoid conception. It has asserted in the strongest terms alike the positive duty of procreation and the gain to the marital life of the parents which is secured by their having children. It has asserted that, while intercourse has a value of its own and serves to cement the marital tie and marital affection, procreation is its primary end, and, together with the duty of self-control, supplies what should be the governing principles in regard to intercourse. But it has radically altered the position in regard to the absolute condemnation of contraceptives. In 1920 the Conference, while refusing to judge in every case, however hard, uttered a solemn warning against "unnatural" methods. The position affirmed in 1930, by a majority indeed, but by a majority of almost three to one, is different. Not only has the traditional description "unnatural" been dropped, and not only has the Conference refused to judge in certain cases, but it has expressly stated that where there is a clearly felt moral obligation to limit or to avoid conception, and where there is a morally sound reason for avoiding complete abstinence, methods may be used other than the primary and obvious method of abstaining from intercourse. The precise meaning of the language which is used, and the question as to whether this change of attitude is right, are inevitably the main problems to be faced in this review.

But before attempting these tasks two points may well be noted. Few things present at the moment a graver problem than the task of

bringing home to Church-people the duty of procreation. It is at least arguable, and the present writer believes more than arguable, that insistence on this duty is far more likely to convince consciences when the legitimacy of contraceptives in certain cases has been frankly recognized. As has been said, the Church's attitude as to procreation was widely discounted because it was associated with an absolute condemnation of contraceptives which many practising Church-people regarded as mistaken. Few clergy realize the very great extent to which the traditional prohibition had come to be regarded as wrong and to be ignored, or the extent to which this had restricted the influence of the Church in the matter. This loss of influence has directly contributed to the increased use of contraceptives, not only where they may be legitimate, but from motives which are certainly selfish and wrong. Further, even when the traditional teaching was taken more seriously the position involved grave dangers. When there was a strong and only half-conscious fear on the part of either husband or wife of another pregnancy, attention was liable to be diverted from the full and honest consideration of the reasons for and against another child, and conscience lulled into quietude, by the concentration of attention on the question as to whether the use of contraceptives was legitimate, *assuming another pregnancy to be wrong*. The main question, that is to say, was apt to be begged. The resolution of the present Lambeth Conference concentrates attention on what is, if the Bishops are right, the real issue and on what is in any case the most serious issue.

It has also to be remembered that nothing is more disastrous to the Church's moral authority, more particularly in regard to its inevitable demands for real and great self-sacrifice, than persistence in maintaining prohibitions which deal too simply and in part mistakenly with real evils; yet such persistence may result, and even appear a moral duty, as the outcome of two of the subtlest of ecclesiastical temptations: the tendency of loyalty to dictate a too rigid conservatism, and the tendency of asceticism to hold necessarily right that course which is hardest, merely because it is hardest. In no small degree the Church lost control which might have prevented or mitigated the evils of capitalism through failure to reconsider and modify at a sufficiently early stage its absolute condemnation of interest and to substitute in time a less simple but better grounded discrimination between usury and interest. If the position adopted in the Lambeth resolution is in fact justified, its frank declaration may well prove a very great gain. At the least it should make it possible for all Church-people to unite in insisting on the duty of procreation, unless it would be wrong to bring about conception, even if they are divided as to whether in certain cases contraceptives may be legitimately used.

The major questions remain as to what is the exact meaning of the Lambeth resolutions, and in particular Resolution 15, and as to whether the position adopted is the right position.

In regard to the precise meaning of the Resolution 15 the important points are: (a) That any attempt to combine intercourse with the avoidance of conception is condemned unless there is a "clearly felt moral obligation to avoid or limit conception"; (b) that even in that event the "primary and obvious method" (of avoiding conception) is a life of complete abstinence lived in the power of the Holy Spirit; but (c) that if there is a morally sound reason against complete abstinence other methods may be used, and that the choice as between complete abstinence and the

use of other methods must be governed by Christian principles.* Each of these points calls for comment.

In regard to the first it is to be noted that the criterion is a clearly felt moral obligation to avoid conception. What is crucial, in consequence, is the judgment of the individual conscience rather than more objective conditions. This leads to grave danger of self-deception, danger which the individual ought fully to recognize. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the criterion is right. The Church has authority to decide moral issues. The question as to whether conception ought or ought not to be avoided turns in part on other than moral issues, often, although not invariably, of a medical character. In regard to such issues neither the Church nor any individual priest possesses any special authority. There is the clearest obligation on the parties concerned to secure any necessary advice, but, save as they may find it helpful to discuss such advice with their clergy, in order to avoid self-deception, its evaluation is not the concern of the Church's ministers, and these would not in general be particularly qualified themselves to give such advice.

In regard to the second point the question arises as to how far "a life of complete abstinence lived in the power of the Holy Spirit" is to be regarded as the "higher" course. That it is so, in much the same sense in which religious celibacy is a higher life than matrimony, the writer fully believes, as also that there is in the choice in question a special consideration in favour of abstinence. But he believes that this view needs justification and elaboration by reference to general considerations which will appear at a later stage of the discussion rather than that it is necessarily implied by the phrase "primary and obvious method." More cannot legitimately be read into that phrase than its context requires, and it is difficult to deny that, apart from any other consideration, in any situation in which a certain act leads naturally to a certain result, the "primary and obvious" method of avoiding the result consists in avoiding the action. Moreover, the resolution gives further content to the word "primary," and to the earlier statement that procreation should supply a governing consideration, in that the use of contraceptives is legitimate only if there is a morally sound reason against abstinence. In such circumstances "primary" has in the context adequate content even if it does not connote "higher," and while the use of the word "primary" does not exclude "higher," it cannot be regarded as actually connoting or as necessarily implying "higher." This conclusion is confirmed by another consideration. In recent discussion of the legitimacy of using contraceptives the position has very commonly been taken up that, at least in some sense, abstinence is the higher course. Further, the Lambeth Committee's report itself used language of this character, although somewhat carefully safeguarded. It would in consequence have been natural for the full Conference to use the word "higher," or at the least to echo more definitely this language of the Committee, had the Conference desired to assert without reservation that abstinence was the higher course; and it is very difficult to avoid the conclusion that the word "primary" was deliberately employed, not necessarily as excluding "higher" in every sense, but at least so as to avoid some implications which the latter word might well have been supposed to possess, as, for

* The important point has recently been put to the writer that in the further choice as between contraceptive methods, moral as well as medical considerations may be involved. The issues thus raised cannot, however, be discussed in this review.

example, that there would always be some falling away from the will of God unless abstinence was the course chosen.

In regard to the sanction given to the use of other methods than abstinence when it would be wrong to bring about conception and when there is a morally sound reason against complete abstinence, the first thing to be noted is the extent of the change from the resolution in 1920. As has been said, there is now not merely a refusal to judge in specially hard cases. There is explicit sanction of "other methods" given certain specified and all-important conditions. Further, the characterization of contraceptives as unnatural, and the grave warning against these as being unnatural, are now absent. It is obvious that the phrase "other methods" covers contraceptives; that it was meant to do so; and that it is being correctly interpreted in this sense. On the other hand, it is very important to keep clear the exact extent of the departure from traditional teaching, all the more important in view of a considerable amount of current criticism which would only make sense if the Church had until now condemned absolutely any attempt to combine intercourse with the avoidance of procreation when procreation was undesirable. In fact, however, there was previously no such absolute condemnation. A distinction was drawn in favour of the attempt to combine intercourse with the avoidance of procreation by restricting intercourse to the so-called "safe period." There is a very real departure from traditional teaching in regard to what is now sanctioned; but the departure consists simply in the refusal to draw any moral distinction between restricting intercourse to the "safe period" with the express purpose of avoiding procreation and the use of certain other methods which have precisely the same purpose. Further, it is to be noted that the absence of any such distinction cuts both ways. It not only has the effect of sanctioning the use of "other methods" in certain circumstances. It involves also an unusually clear and absolute condemnation of the deliberate restriction of intercourse to the so-called "safe period" in all but the same circumstances—i.e., unless there is a clearly felt moral obligation to limit or avoid conception and unless there is a morally sound reason against complete abstinence.

Before passing on to discuss how far the Lambeth resolution is right in thus judging alike, and simply by their purpose, one method of attempting to avoid conception which has previously been tolerated, and other methods having that same end, but which were previously condemned, the very important question remains as to what is meant by a "morally sound reason" against complete abstinence, and by the requirement that the choice as between abstinence and other methods (as well as the use made of other methods) must be governed by "Christian principles." In the first place, the language used makes it clear that any "morally sound reason" must be a moral reason. A choice which has to be made in the light of Christian principles cannot be made for reasons of any lesser character, such as have reference, for example, merely to sensual pleasure or depend merely on preference. Secondly, and for the same reason, a "morally sound reason" cannot be said to be constituted solely by the existence of some one consideration weighing against abstinence, even if that one consideration is in itself a sound moral consideration. It must outweigh the considerations which favour abstinence; in other words, in the case of the individual in question complete abstinence must be judged to be prejudicial to God's purpose for his or her life taken as a

whole. Again, a reason for action cannot be morally sound in an important choice unless it is accepted only after due consideration and after securing any advice or assistance which may reasonably be thought necessary in order to reach a sound conclusion. Again, it is to be noted that in this instance it is not a question of whether the reason is felt to be, but of whether it is morally sound. Unlike the case for or against conception, the issues involved are, predominantly, of a purely moral character. They are in consequence issues in which the Church's teaching should afford to Church-people authoritative guidance, and the "Christian principles" by which their choice should be guided must be those general and particular principles which the Church has enunciated and which are relevant, rather than "principles" adopted by the parties for themselves.* The most important of those principles which are general have been mentioned; but to these must be added a *normal* duty not to pursue a course gravely prejudicial to health. In regard to those which are particular, the resolutions indicate certain principles as relevant: first of all, that there may (but may not) be a morally sound reason against abstinence; secondly, that the primary purpose of procreation and the duty of self-control supply (in some real and important sense) the governing considerations in regard to intercourse; and lastly, that intercourse has a value of its own in marriage and serves to cement and enhance the marital tie and marital affection.

The questions which remain are whether the Lambeth Conference, or rather the large majority which affirmed Resolution 15, are right in refusing to distinguish between the use of contraceptives and the deliberate restriction of intercourse to the "safe period"; whether and on what grounds they are right in holding that there may be sound moral reasons against complete abstinence when it would be wrong to bring about conception; and what conclusions follow as to the sense, if any, in which complete abstinence constitutes the higher course. Any discussion of such questions is necessarily difficult. Further, the presentation of any view and the drawing of conclusions are liable to be determined by individual bias or prejudice. This danger is obvious in the event of any excess of sensuality and also in the case of persons whose own lives are directly affected by the conclusions reached. It may be no less real, although less obvious, in other circumstances. In any intimate matter, with a strong emotional reaction, a due sense of reverence is only too apt to find expression in excessive conservatism. That is one lesson which

* It would appear to follow from the Lambeth resolutions that a confessor would not be justified in refusing absolution to persons using contraceptives, on the ground that there was no sufficient reason against conception, provided there was a clearly felt moral obligation to limit conception and provided this was felt in good faith; but that he would be justified in refusing absolution on the ground that the reason against complete abstinence was not morally sound even if the individual held in good faith that it was. He ought, of course, to judge moral soundness in the light of the resolutions—*e.g.*, he would be open to censure if he refused absolution on the ground that there could not be a morally sound reason for using contraceptives. The writer is unable to understand the contention recently advanced that, because the Lambeth Conference is not a synod, confessors should still refuse absolution, acting on the view that contraceptives are always wrong. At least so far as Anglicans are concerned, this view rested simply on the agreement of theologians, not on any decree of an oecumenical council or even of some authoritative synod. In consequence, it is radically affected by an opposite pronouncement by a large majority of Anglican Bishops, whether or not made in a synod. An element of complete unreality will be introduced into our conceptions of Church order if confessors hold it right to refuse absolution to those who adopt in good faith a position expressly endorsed by a majority of our bishops.

is writ large in the history alike of religion and ethics. Further, the tendency to an instinctive "sex taboo," with which in its more serious manifestations psycho-pathologists are so often concerned, may be present in a far less dangerous degree, but so as to constitute a strong bias tending to limit as narrowly as possible what is regarded as legitimate in sexual intercourse. Of these two latter grounds of bias the first is in all probability the more serious, but neither can be ignored. The dangers, to which reference has been made, of an opposite bias are at least as great as they are obvious, and are only not by far the greater because they are the more obvious and admit of self-deception somewhat less easily. In every case the only adequate safeguard against bias consists in objectivity in discussion, in reliance only on reasoned argument, and distrust of any conclusions which cannot be fully supported thereby.

These considerations, and the importance at the moment of the issues involved, must serve to explain and to excuse the length of this article, and the fact that when absolutely necessary to the discussion the writer feels bound to use considerable frankness. But they have also an immediate relevance to the issue which has next to be considered. It is scarcely too much to say that the main difficulty in discussing this issue lies in the difficulty of disentangling from vehement denunciation of the use of contraceptives the reasons which are held to justify the distinction which is thus drawn between the use of contraceptives and the deliberate confining of intercourse to the "safe period." This disproportion between vehement condemnation and argument is of itself significant, and the suggestion of bias is supported when consideration is given to some of the arguments which are actually employed. For example, taking advantage of the "safe period" is defended on the ground that it is not completely safe; yet the inference is not drawn that for what the argument is worth contraceptives which were not certainly effective would be capable of like defence. Again, it is said that the use of contraceptives amounts to murder. But no substantial moral difference is involved, from this point of view, between deliberately confining the initiation of a process, which would normally lead to conception, to periods when this will not occur and taking steps to secure otherwise that the initiation of the process does not result in conception. Test the alleged difference in the case of saving rather than creating life. A judgment of murder would follow, at least morally, if a course of action necessary to save life was deliberately employed only in circumstances in which it was likely to be ineffectual, and was actually unsuccessful, as well as if it was employed with certain precautions which were likely to render it ineffectual. A case in which it is thought worth while to employ such arguments is open to grave suspicion that it is a bad case.

Four arguments require more serious consideration. It is alleged that contraceptives ought to be, and must be, forbidden, because if they are tolerated their misuse will be too certain and too serious; that their use contradicts Christian instinct; that the tradition in the Church which condemns their use ought to have been regarded as conclusive; and that they are unnatural and therefore wrong. In regard to the first of these arguments the main and it would appear conclusive reply is that it contradicts the general principle that the possibility, or even the practical certainty, of misuse cannot be held to preclude legitimate use. The case to be made for the condemnation of contraceptives on the ground of misuse is parallel to that for the absolute condemnation by the Church

of the use of alcohol. But in that, as in other instances, the principle that abuse does not preclude use has been held conclusive. Another analogy is even closer, and in the writer's judgment illuminating. Suppose the knowledge of a particular drug to have largely arisen in connection with "doping," and suppose that it was commonly used for this purpose. This would not be held morally to preclude its use in medicine in circumstances in which it was desirable and important to produce its particular effect; and that view would be taken even if its availability for legitimate use necessarily increased in some degree the possibility of obtaining it for improper purposes.*

The argument from Christian instinct asserts that the use of contraceptives is condemned by Christian "instinct" so generally and so strongly as to make it clear that their use is wrong and ought to be so regarded. The weakness of this argument turns in the first instance on the number of cases in which new views have been condemned no less generally or strongly, but in regard to which time has shown that the condemnation could not be maintained. The original attitude over the evolution of man affords perhaps the best example; but examples could easily be multiplied. It is always possible that the alleged intuition is due to conservatism, all the more possible in any intimate matter or in any matter which is felt to be peculiarly sacred. Again, the judgment may turn at least in some degree on failure to make necessary distinctions. In this special case there may also be present some tendency to sex taboo, and the rationalization of this as moral scruple. But in all probability conservatism of feeling affords the main explanation, if the alleged intuition is not well founded. Fortunately two criteria go far to render it possible to determine whether strongly held judgments are or are not due primarily to this bias. When, as in this instance, there is a marked age line in regard to the acceptance of new opinion, when the traditional and rigorist position is rejected by a far higher proportion of the younger clergy and younger theologians of all schools, there is very strong ground for the suspicion that the intuitive judgment is determined, at least as regards its precise form, by conservatism. If, after considerable discussion, it is unable to advance any satisfactory ground for its conclusion, that suspicion turns to practical certainty.

It is almost always the case, however, that such an intuition is an exaggeration or undue simplification of truth, rather than wholly mistaken. But, even if the Lambeth Conference is right, that is the case in this instance. It is essential to assert that it is very gravely wrong to avoid procreation unless this is really undesirable, or to indulge in intercourse merely for sensual pleasure. As the writer believes, there is more even than this in the alleged intuition—namely, that intercourse with the deliberate exclusion of procreation is always a "second best." It may, in certain cases, be right as against abstinence; it is always a second best as against those circumstances in which it is right to allow the possibility of conception. The writer believes, indeed, that it is only when this is fully realized that contraceptives can be used without moral loss. But, on the major issue, having regard to the history of other cases where the intuition of Christians has strongly condemned modifications of beliefs which had subsequently to be made, and having regard to the age line already apparent in the present case, the alleged intuition cannot be regarded as evidence for the sinfulness of using contraceptives *in all*

* The duty of safeguarding, so far as possible, its sale would, of course, remain.

circumstances, unless it can justify itself either by appealing to the authority of the Church's tradition or by having shown a capacity, and a growing capacity, to embody in arguments of a satisfactory character its grounds for this rigid condemnation.

The argument from the tradition of the Church turns for its force on the sense in which that tradition should be regarded as authoritative. If it is supposed, in effect, that a reliable procedure is afforded by the excogitation of received opinion with always the gravest possible bias against any substantial modification, then the argument is very strong indeed. That this attitude has been and is common cannot be denied. Whether it is legitimate is another matter. Again and again it has done wellnigh irreparable harm, notably over historical criticism and in regard to evolution. Such an attitude inevitably results, as in the instance quoted, in a "rearguard action": first complete rejection; then concessions without any adequate attempt at restatement and combined with quibbling which seeks to bring the concessions within the terms of the original belief; then a landslide of opinion, more particularly, but not only, outside the Church, which in rejecting what is wrong rejects also vital truths of which the original beliefs were too simple and too crude an expression. Reference has been made earlier to an instance which is within the field of Christian ethics. The history of the controversy as to "usury" is extraordinarily relevant to the present issue. First and for long the taking of interest as such was condemned, then concessions were made which it could be maintained were in accord with the condemnation, then there came the inevitable landslide and, with it, great loss of control and failure to distinguish effectively between what ought and ought not to be regarded as within Christian duty. The economic history of Europe might have been far less evil if the Church had been prepared to modify, frankly, and in time, a traditional condemnation in order to maintain more effectively the condemnation of what is in fact wrong in "usury."

It is important to emphasize that for the moment the only question under discussion is whether traditional teaching should have precluded by its authority such a departure as that made by the Lambeth resolutions, not whether there are other decisive considerations against the departure. It is difficult to resist the view that in a very substantial degree a marked reliance on authority is a large factor in the present outcry against what Lambeth has done. In so far as it is a factor the issue is (as Fr. Milner-White and Fr. Wilfred Knox pointed out) part of a very much wider question. In agreement with these two members of the Cambridge Oratory the writer is convinced, and increasingly convinced, on the one hand that an overwhelming case could be built up (and gradually is being built up), both for Christian belief and for Anglo-Catholicism, on the basis of a rational conception of authority; but on the other hand not merely that an oracular conception of authority affords no adequate ground for rejecting the Roman position, but that such a conception cannot be justified in the long run at the bar of reason, and affords in consequence no adequate defence of Christianity.

The alternative course for those who believe that the Church receives real guidance and possesses real authority is to recognize frankly that guidance into all truth is consistent with crudity or simplicity of formulation at any given stage, and to realize that loyalty to the Church's tradition is consistent with (and in particular cases may even require) modification

of that tradition so as to present truths which have to be preserved, and to draw lines which have to be drawn, more accurately, and therefore in a form which can be more effectually maintained. Given this conception of the authority of the Church's traditional teaching, such a modification as that made by the Lambeth Conference in the Church's teaching as to birth control cannot be regarded as necessarily precluded by the existing tradition. What is involved is simply the assertion that whereas the use of contraceptives is very commonly wrong, the issue was dealt with too simply by an absolute condemnation, and that the real criteria are more complicated.*

In regard to the particular tradition as to contraceptives it is important also to recognise the extent to which the Church's absolute condemnation of the use of contraceptives has been explained and defended on the ground that their use is unnatural, and that in a sense which is not applicable to confining intercourse to the "safe period" with the express purpose of avoiding procreation. As a consequence the necessity for modification of the traditional teaching becomes the more probable, and modification becomes less open to criticism, in so far as that argument cannot be maintained. Both for this reason and because the argument is still widely used, it requires serious attention. Yet it is extraordinarily difficult to take it seriously. In view of the toleration of confining intercourse to the "safe period" with the purpose of avoiding conception, "unnaturalness" cannot depend simply on the purpose in view in the use of contraceptives, and the proposition which has to be considered is in consequence that it is legitimate to contrive, but wholly illegitimate to use contrivances, in the endeavour to achieve this purpose. It is said that use of the "safe period" involves only the use of natural laws and of facts of the physiological process in question. But contraceptives depend no less on natural laws and on facts of the physiological process. Reference has already been made to another argument, that contraception is equivalent to murder, and to the impossibility of drawing any moral distinction between deliberately confining a course of action to circumstances in which it will not have the effect in question and taking positive steps to prevent its having this effect. It is argued that use of the "safe period" involves self-control, whereas contraceptives do not. In so far as that is true it is a very bad argument. The Lambeth Conference is obviously right in insisting on the paramount importance of self-control in regard to marital intercourse. But that obligation and the opportunity to exercise it remain even when contraceptives are used. An obligation to self-control and temperance does not necessarily imply any obligation to one particular course, and render this alone natural, because it demands these virtues, unless it is the only course which is consistent with their exhibition. Even if one course involves self-control in an unusual degree, that does not necessarily make it the only right course. The canon

* It does not necessarily follow that the original blank condemnation was not the right course when it was first formulated. Onanism in its original sense was then, and for long after, the only method of birth control *commonly* available, and all opinion is united in condemnation of this. Medical knowledge was less able than it now is to determine when it would be wrong to bring about conception. Knowledge, which was closely relevant to the issue, more especially of psychopathology, was not available. As a matter of practice, and for the time being, a blank condemnation may well originally have been at once inevitable and best. Much the same may be said *mutatis mutandis* of the original condemnation of the taking of interest.

cannot possibly be accepted, having regard to all sorts of other problems, that a method of doing something, which from the nature of the method requires most self-control, is necessarily the only "natural" method for a Christian, and in consequence the only right method. What is as true as it is important is that for a Christian no course of action can properly be ruled out or reckoned wrong merely because it is hard. But that is an altogether different proposition. It establishes that not even complete abstinence can be ruled out merely because it requires great self-control. It does not establish that abstinence or the restriction of intercourse to the "safe period" is necessarily right merely because of the greater self-control which is necessary.

In fact, however, all these other arguments have always behind them the view that contraceptives are unnatural because they are "interfering with nature." It is, however, just here that the case is weakest. As has been said, the traditional position involves the view that it is not necessary to condemn absolutely attempts to secure the end in question by contrivance, but that it is necessary to condemn absolutely any use of contrivances for the same end. Even waiving the difficulty which this distinction presents, the question must be answered as to whether, so far from its being unnatural for man to use either contrivance or contrivances to control natural processes, so that certain of their natural consequences result and others do not, it is not in fact a specific characteristic of man to do so, and whether it is not in consequence natural for man to acquire knowledge and to use it in this way. The affirmative answer (which is inevitable) renders it impossible, however, to say that the use of contraceptives is, in any ordinary sense, unnatural. It is, of course, the case that any application of knowledge becomes unnatural to man at his best if made to exclude an end which he ought to pursue or in pursuit of ends not ethically desirable. But that consideration fails, since it would render the use of contraceptives "unnatural," even in this sense, only when it would be right to bring about conception, or if the "other ends" were not ethically desirable.

It may indeed fairly be insisted, on the ground of man's duty to co-operate with the Divine purpose, that *in general* it is wrong to engage in any action for the sake of other ends while seeking to preclude by any means its primary biological end. This particular argument rests, however, on a presumption from the fact that an action has an original biological end to the belief that the realization of this end is desirable, and in accordance with the Divine will, in any particular case. If in the particular instance there is good reason to believe that the realization of the end would not be in accordance with that will, the argument is irrelevant. It only condemns the exclusion of the end in question in so far as there is no sufficient reason for setting aside a general presumption that the end ought to be realized or at least can properly be realized. It does not in consequence in any way affect the question as to whether procreation may properly be precluded, intercourse being pursued for other ends, when there is sufficient reason to conclude that it would be wrong to bring about conception. Indeed, if in the course of evolution an action has acquired and come to serve ends other than an original biological end, and if these other ends possess real ethical value, an obligation to fulfil the Divine purpose (as evidenced by the ends which actions in fact serve) points rather to a duty to employ the action for these ends, even if it cannot properly be employed for its original end, using man's power of controlling nature to exclude this last.

This consideration and the impossibility in any case of regarding it as unnatural (and therefore necessarily wrong) for man to use contrivance or contrivances to effect a selection between the normal results of his actions are open to two possible criticisms. It is always possible that the realization of other ends might depend on the realization simultaneously of the primary end of a particular action. But in the case in question that objection is negatived by the fact that intercourse is not condemned when it is known that conception cannot result (*e.g.*, known sterility), and that admittedly it serves other ethical ends in such circumstances. Again, the further objection naturally suggests itself that even if it is not the case that the other ends are only realized simultaneously with the primary end, their realization might nevertheless depend on the absence of any attempt to exclude the primary end. To that objection three replies can be made. In the first place there is the old difficulty that the traditional distinction turns not on exclusion, but on the method of exclusion, whether it is by contrivance or by contrivances. In the second place there is the absence of any argument, which appears to be valid, for this dependence. In the third place there is impressive medical testimony to the fact that there is no such dependence. Ordinary medical opinion is so divided as to contraceptives as to suggest that ordinary practice, and even gynæcological practice, affords no sufficiently clear grounds to determine opinion, and that this is governed by individual prejudices, religious or other. But in the case of psychiatrists, and of neurologists whose approach is psychological—in short, in the case of those peculiarly qualified to speak on this issue—the situation would appear to be different. So far as the present writer can judge after careful enquiry, there is an overwhelming balance of opinion in favour of the view that complete abstinence, when it would be wrong to bring about conception, very commonly imposes a grave strain not only on mental and nervous health, but on marital affection, and also that intercourse, even with the use of contraceptives, can and normally does serve “*ad fovendum amorem et ad sedendam concupiscentiam.*”*

Even if, as appears to be the case, there is no satisfactory ground for maintaining that the use of contraceptives is unnatural and *necessarily* wrong when procreation would be wrong, the questions remain as to the circumstances in which their use is right as against abstinence and as to the sense in which abstinence is the “higher” course. Certain conditions which are obvious have already emerged. Here, as always, there is the

* It is well to emphasise that, if intercourse thus possesses a quasi-sacramental significance and effect even when conception is precluded, ground is afforded for the absolute condemnation of irregular connections even when steps are taken to prevent conception, and thus to avoid the risk of a child being born without the opportunity for a proper family life. In such connections intercourse is misused, since it ought to be used to express marital affection and the marital relation, and since its use otherwise interferes with this. One of two results follows from misuse. Either lesser but real relationships are established and cemented; or, what is worse, so much misuse has taken place that this has ceased to be the case, or at any rate to be consciously the case, and the degree in which intercourse can fulfil later its quasi-sacramental function in marriage is thereby gravely affected. In short, the conception of intercourse, which is behind the view that the use of contraceptives is legitimate when conception ought not to be brought about, affords ground for condemning irregular connections even when contraceptives are used to avoid the risk of a child being born. No one who has had to meet any intelligent presentation of the case for “free love” or “trial marriages” can be ignorant of the growing need for such ground. A complete reply requires, of course, considerable expansion of the argument indicated in this note.

strongest possible obligation to temperance, self-control, and unselfishness in marital intercourse. Again, there ought, in the writer's judgment, to be a clear realization that the situation in which it is possible, and right, to allow conception is the ideal situation even if, when it does not exist, intercourse with the use of contraceptives, rather than abstinence, may in particular cases be the better course, and therefore the best course which is possible. Again, here as always in regard to marital intercourse, there must be a morally sound reason against abstinence: intercourse must not take place merely for the sake of sensual pleasure. But subject to these conditions, intercourse with the use of contraceptives would appear to be legitimate, in itself, when it would be wrong to bring about conception. Further, it is a Christian principle that, save for some special and sufficient cause, it is presumptuous (and wrong) to rely on special gifts of grace to secure ends which we can secure by natural means, and to avoid dangers which are involved in the neglect of these means. If it is not unnatural (or wrong) to have intercourse with a view to other ethical ends, excluding conception by the use of contraceptives, when it would be wrong to bring about conception, and if such intercourse does in fact serve "*ad fovendum amorem et ad sedendam concupiscentiam*," while abstinence may involve real dangers to health and even to a proper marital affection, then this principle would appear to be applicable. Nor is it a reply to say that these ends have often been obtained otherwise, and these dangers avoided, by special gifts of grace. Take the extreme case of failure to use the sacraments of the Gospel. It is clear that God gives gifts of grace ordinarily obtainable through the sacraments, not only when for good reasons the sacraments cannot be used, but even when they are not used, mistakenly but in all good faith, and this in a very remarkable degree when (as, *e.g.*, with the early Quakers) the course actually adopted involves much self-sacrifice.

What has been said does not, however, constitute of itself a sufficient justification of the use of contraceptives in any particular case. It is, as has been said, a "Christian principle" in regard to the adoption of any course that there must not only be some valid argument in favour of that course, but that there must not be preponderating arguments in favour of another course. In short, a "morally sound reason" for or against a particular course of action involves a conclusion of the moral judgment that by acting in the manner chosen the individual can best serve God and best fulfil God's purpose for him or her. It is clear, however, that certain activities, and more especially certain spiritual activities and forms of prayer, can ordinarily be realized only at the cost of repressing and sublimating the sexual instincts, and also that various other activities, less immediately religious, may involve this or be realized better when this has taken place. The possibility of a vocation to serve God in some such way, and to pay this price, ought to be faced before marriage is accepted as the right vocation. Very occasionally it may involve after marriage the abandonment of an ordinary marital life even when there is no other reason against procreation. It is obvious that when there are independent reasons for regarding it as wrong to bring about conception, and in consequence one "end," and that the biologically primary "end," of intercourse cannot rightly be realized, the possibility that God can best be served by abstinence must again be considered very seriously indeed. When such a vocation exists, it not only confers obviously a right to claim and to expect the gifts of grace necessary for such a life, freeing

such an attitude from any presumption, but it affords (in the language of the Lambeth Committee's report) "the opportunity for the highest exercise of Christian love and self-denial." But there may be no such vocation. In the first place, as over the question of becoming a "religious," there may be reasons of health or of temperament which are so strong as to render it wrong to rely on gifts of grace to overcome the physical or temperamental disability. Further, this may be the case, alike in regard to becoming a religious and in regard to the issue in question, even if there is a real desire for the life or activities which are involved. In the second place, there may be unavoidable circumstances of life, other gifts, or other opportunities of service which would be prejudicially affected, directly or indirectly, to an improper extent, either by the surrender in question or by the pursuit of the activities in question in the manner and degree which is necessary if sublimation is to take place. Lastly, there simply may not be the call. For any one of these reasons a true vocation may be absent. But both the importance to the Church of the work which can be done at the cost of repression and sublimation, and the need for more persons who are willing and able to pay that price, are such as to render it right to insist that for a Christian there must be a reason, and a "morally sound reason," if this course is not to be taken; and that the issue arises in this form before marriage, and, again, if the primary end of intercourse can no longer rightly be fulfilled. If, but only if, in the individual case there is such a reason does it become legitimate and right either to marry or, when it would be wrong to bring about conception, to continue intercourse "*ad fovendum amorem et ad sedendam concupiscentiam*."

On such a view complete abstinence is a primary (and in some sense higher) course with another meaning than that the primary as well as the obvious method of avoiding the ordinary result of an action is to avoid the action, and the use of the word "primary" in the Lambeth resolution can properly be given this further content. Abstinence is a course which ought first to be considered and only rejected for good reason. But it is important to insist that, in all cases in which there is such a reason, for the individuals in question their duty, and for them the higher course, lies in a decision against complete abstinence. Further, it is important to insist also, to use again the language of the report of the Lambeth Committee, that this course "still calls for the same exhibition of Christian self-discipline and virtue." It is a perfectly sound principle that there is for Christians no course, and more especially no pleasant course, which does not involve directly or indirectly grave duties and responsibilities. But when, for example, this truth is embodied in such a phrase as "taking the jam without the powder," it is well to remember that the "powder" may not always be the same. The absence of strain and the particular background afforded by a more normal marital life than is usually consistent with complete abstinence are things not merely to be enjoyed, but to be used in the service of God.

For reasons which he has tried to make clear, the writer believes that the Lambeth resolution as to birth control is not only valuable in its general upshot, but that it states with great precision what should and can be maintained as to the duty of Christian men and women. On only one point would he venture respectful criticism of a resolution which is obviously the outcome of careful effort and which seems to him of such a character and of such precision as to show real guidance. Almost all

competent opinion is agreed that specially grave objections exist against postponing unduly a first child. This might well have been stated in a separate resolution. For the rest, while it is obviously too much to hope that all theologians will acquiesce in the view endorsed by the Lambeth Conference, and that the controversy can now cease, it cannot be too strongly insisted that in much current discussion attention is being so exclusively given to criticism of the Lambeth resolution, on the ground that it sanctions the use of contraceptives in certain circumstances, as to obscure to a disastrous extent the very strong and impressive condemnation of contraceptives in all but these circumstances. WILL SPENS.

[NOTE.—The above was written before the Archbishop of Canterbury's address to Convocation. It is impossible to be sufficiently thankful for the emphasis which this has given to the fact that, so far from any general condonation of the use of contraceptives, their use was approved by the Lambeth Conference only when there is a moral obligation to avoid conception and a morally sound reason against abstinence. On one point, but one point only, is there any ground for respectful criticism. When the Primate described abstinence as the "nobler" course he used, when speaking for himself, language which suggested that this depended on something morally objectionable in the use of contraceptives. If the use of contraceptives is ever right, it is difficult to maintain this position. It is true, and requires continual emphasis, that abstinence is the "nobler" course when health and circumstances render it a right vocation, just as religious celibacy is a "nobler" course than matrimony. But sounder ground is secured if the view is taken that this is so not because of anything inherently wrong in the alternative, but because of the ends for which (in either case) the surrender is made, and because of the need for men and women willing and able to make that surrender. The position suggested by the Primate would indeed work out in practice in much the same way as that indicated above, since, *save when health and circumstances admit of sublimation, and not merely repression*, grave strain on health is very likely to result in the cases in question. But, just because it is important to insist that there is a real sense in which abstinence is the "nobler" course, and the only right course for those called to it, it is also important to base such insistence on premisses which are wholly consistent with an approval of the use of contraceptives within the limits defined by the Lambeth resolution.] W. S.

INDEPENDENT NOTE

Any discussion of this question must be prefaced by some statement of general principles. I begin by assuming a position which Professor Sorley, in his great book *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, seems to me to have established once and for all—namely, the fundamental difference between value-judgments (whether judgments of moral or of æsthetic value) and existential judgments. In an existential judgment the copula is "is"; in a judgment of moral value it is "ought." No logical alchemy can ever extract an "ought" from any amount of "ises"; even Utilitarianism, which endeavours to reduce all moral judgments to an existential or scientific form, is compelled to posit the scientifically

unproved and unprovable assumption, that one "ought" to act in such a way as to promote the greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible number. The ethical value or moral quality inherent in a given course of action is something which is apprehended by an activity or faculty of the self which, whether we call it conscience, ethical intuition, or the "moral consciousness," is decisively other than the senses which supply us with the raw material of cognition and the scientific understanding whereby we sort out this raw material and arrange it as an ordered universe. In the last resort, all ethical systems, which really are ethical systems and not merely systems of mental, physical, or social hygiene, are intuitionistic.

This does not mean that moral judgments are irrational or merely subjective, or that reason has no part to play in their formation. What is discerned by intuition is a particular "this"—namely, the moral quality or value inherent in a given action; and reason can, by colligating and analyzing the data of the moral consciousness, reveal the eternal and universal values which underlie them. Reason can, moreover, in case of doubt, elucidate the bearing of an universal law upon a particular problem of conduct. But, within the moral sphere and in the last resort, reason is the handmaid and not the directress of intuition; it is for conscience to utter its "categorical imperative," to lay down its axioms or canons, and for reason then to explain them, if it can and so far as it can.

It follows that the world of moral laws is wrapped in a mystery as profound as that which conceals the world of physical "things-in-themselves" from our sight. The contention often heard, that "it is not enough to say that such and such a thing is wrong: we must be prepared to explain why it is wrong," utterly misconstrues the nature of moral judgments, and ignores the unearthly majesty and the transcendent authority of the moral ideal.

οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε καὶ χθές, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ποτε
ζῇ ταῦτα, κούδεις οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη.*

Aristotle puts this point in blunt and homely fashion when he tells us that the man who asks for an intellectual demonstration of the duty of honouring parents really needs not ἀπόδειξις but κόλασις. This principle, of the primacy and unique and immediate authority of conscience or moral intuition in the sphere of conduct, represents the fundamental dividing line, the Rubicon, the great gulf fixed which severs the ethical tradition of Hellenism at its best, and of the Bible, from the ethic of naturalism, materialism, hedonism, and utilitarianism. There can be no truce and no accommodation between the view which sees in the moral laws eternal facts of the spiritual order, apprehended by faith and not by sight, and that which regards them as relative, changeable, based upon no more reliable foundation than a perpetually self-adjusting calculus of ever-shifting material expediencies.

It is within the domain of sexual morals that the contrast between the transcendental and the materialistic view-points most vividly expresses itself. If the scientific understanding is entitled to deal with the matter empirically and inductively, without regard to any authority higher than itself, then doubtless the act of physical union can only

* Soph., Ant., 456-7.

be regarded, in Aldous Huxley's cynical phrase, as an "experiment in applied physiology," and any rules that may be devised by biology and medicine for regulating such experiments are likely to differ *toto cælo* from the traditional morality of the Christian Church. If, on the other hand, the primacy of conscience be admitted, in such wise that its deliveries can claim an unchallengeable right to veneration and obedience, no matter whether the scientific understanding be prepared to back them up with prudential considerations or not—and if, further, the problem of sex be envisaged in the light of faith in God, which regards every exertion of generative power on man's part as accompanied, in virtue of a supernatural "pre-established harmony," by some incomprehensible outflow of creative energy on God's, so that the sexual act must be believed to have repercussions and reverberations spreading out beyond our ken upon the spiritual plane—then we shall be prepared to say, τὸ μυστήριον τοῦτο μέγα ἐστίν; we shall bow to the authority of the moral consciousness, when it pronounces certain modes of sex-activity to be wrong *per se*, quite apart from any physiological consequences or social effects, and shall not demand, as a pre-condition of such submission, an exhaustively reasoned explanation as to *why* they are wrong. At the same time, we shall not rule out *a priori* the possibility that reason, reflecting upon the *dicta* of conscience, may be able dimly to discern, "as in a glass darkly," some great though scarcely definable principle which lies behind the warnings and prohibitions of the law.

We have spoken hitherto of "conscience" or "the moral consciousness," without endeavouring to fix the meaning of these terms. But the question now arises: Whose "conscience"? For the individual, the immediate authority is necessarily his own conscience. But man is a gregarious animal, incomplete in isolation, requiring the circumambient environment of family, tribe, and nation to make him truly man; and his moral life is as deeply knit up with his social relations as is every other aspect of his personality. In order, therefore, to his perfection, he needs to educate and correct his individual conscience by the best light that he has—that is, in accordance with the standards recognized by the corporate intuitions of the social organism in which he is a cell. The Christian can have no doubt as to what is the "beloved community," the supernatural organism in which he inheres, and whose corporate intuitions he is bound to trust and make his own. It is the *civitas Dei* whose ethical intuitions he must take as being far finer and more sensitive than those of any *civitas terrena*—the People of God, with its continuous life, in two successive phases, Jewish-nationalist and Catholic Christian, stretching across the millennia, whose corporate conscience he will recognize as the guide and norm of his own.

It is true that in regard to the whole form of morality, as springing from love of God and of one's neighbour, and in regard to certain areas of its detailed content, the Christian has far more than this: for he has the explicit teaching of our Lord Himself preserved in the Gospels. More particularly is this the case in regard to sex-questions; for the foundation of all Christian thought upon the matter is given in Christ's affirmation of indissoluble, life-long monogamy as the only permissible form of matrimonial relation. Yet even our Lord did not claim that He was promulgating this ideal for the first time; He spoke of it rather as embodying an eternal value, existing in the mind of God from the beginning, the clear intuition of which by the People of God had been obscured by "the hard-

ness of men's hearts." His mission was not to destroy but to fulfil, not to abolish the morality of the Old Covenant but to restore, elucidate, and expand it. Hence, where He does not so elucidate or expand, we must assume that He accepted it as it stood; though this does not mean that He necessarily accepted the glosses which the Rabbinical tradition put upon it (the "Corban" saying is enough to prove that He did not). For the intuitions of the People of God, in its pre-Christian phase, which were not rejected or revised, and must therefore be deemed to have been implicitly approved, by His supreme authority, we shall rather look to the popular *stratum* out of which His first disciples were called; we shall have regard to the simple piety of the common folk, which expressed itself in the *Haggada*, rather than to the casuistic intellectualism of the official leaders of Jewry as embodied in the *Halakha*. If we find such an ethical intuition (a) clearly showing itself in the text of the Old Testament, (b) penetrating the Jewish *Haggada*, (c) not censured, revised or modified by our Lord, and (d) manifested without a dissentient voice in the writings of Christian thinkers from the earliest ages, in the decrees of such ecclesiastical authorities as have dealt with its subject matter, and in the instincts of the rank and file of orthodox Church-folk—then we must conclude that we have to do with one of those fundamental intuitions of the People of God in which the Divine will and nature are revealed to us. For, where no explicit word of the Lord exists, revelation and intuition are one and the same thing, like the concave and convex aspects of a curved line.

I have emphasized the note of immemorial persistence in time, which a given ethical conviction should possess in order to be counted as one of the genuine, deeply rooted intuitions of the *Ecclesia*, with the object of distinguishing what I have called "fundamental intuitions" from phases of opinion temporarily or locally prevalent within the *Ecclesia*. It seems reasonable to apply the Vincentian test of acceptance *semper*, as well as *ubique* and *ab omnibus*, to precepts purporting to be part of the Christian ethical tradition, just as it is applied to doctrines claiming to belong to the Christian Deposit of Faith. If this be granted, it disposes of the contention that the universal repudiation of the mediæval condemnation of "usury" (in the sense of the taking of interest on loans) renders all the Church's ethical teaching liable to revision; for the condemnation in question was not (if our argument is well founded) a genuine intuition of the People of God as such, but merely a prejudice, limited to certain times and certain countries—though it was a prejudice representing a distortion of a real intuition, namely, the Christian perception of the evil of extortion and economic oppression.

We may now approach the particular problem envisaged by Resolution 15 of the Lambeth Conference, bearing in mind the principle that the procedure dictated by the nature of Christian morality is not to enquire what are the best rules which the scientific understanding can construct for dealing with a given situation, but rather to ask, what has the intuition of the People of God seen to be the right course of conduct in relation to this situation? If we can, to a certain extent, rationalize the intuition, or discover intellectual grounds for it, so much the better; but, if not, we shall not for that reason discredit the intuition itself, remembering the mystery which enwraps the very nature of Right and Wrong. Historically regarded, there can be no doubt what the Christian tradition has been and is with regard to these matters. The exceeding

sinfulness of fornication and adultery follows immediately from the Christian conception of marriage; but, besides these, the tradition of the Church further condemns as wrong *per se* (a) self-abuse, (b) unnatural practices within matrimony, and (c) homosexual practices. It is to the second of these categories that the use of contraceptives is assigned by Catholic moral theology.

The horror with which the People of God has regarded the employment of means directly designed to frustrate the primary end of the conjugal act finds its primitive and classical illustration in the narrative of Gen. xxxviii. 8-10 (the story of Onan). The question of the historicity of this narrative is irrelevant to our enquiry; what matters is the principle to which it gives pictorial form. Down to the second, or possibly the first, century of our era, this principle was undisputed amongst the Jews; and there is evidently nothing in the recorded teaching of our Lord to suggest the possibility of its repeal or modification. But in the third century A.D., according to the Talmud, a certain Rabbi Bibi permitted, or indeed enjoined, the use of a certain kind of contraceptive which is in principle identical with certain of those employed at the present day, in three specific cases (those of a wife of immature years, during pregnancy, and during lactation). His *dictum* quotes as an authority R. Meir, whose date is the period of the Antonines; and, if it be assumed that R. Meir was not likely to innovate, the teaching in question may go back as much as a hundred years behind his time. It is, therefore, possible that the question of "birth-control" may have been raised within the first century, before the definite separation of Christianity from its Jewish mother; the problem is, in any case, at least 1,600 years old, and not by any means a modern one, as is often alleged.

The question of the attitude of the Talmud towards the subject has been exhaustively discussed by the American Jewish scholar, Prof. Lauterbach, and the facts just mentioned are drawn from his work.* His conclusions regarding the modified toleration of the practice by certain mediæval Rabbis, building upon the authority of Rabbis Bibi and Meir, have naturally no relevance to a discussion concerned with the morality of the practice for Christians; but what is of great importance is the fact that he adduces no *Haggadic* material whatsoever in this connection. If any had existed favouring "birth-control," so learned a Talmudist would doubtless have quoted it. We may therefore conclude that, whether or no the official divines of first-century Palestinian Judaism had mooted the possibility of making concessions in the matter, the instincts of popular piety in Judaism, at the moment when Christianity was in process of being born from it, were as much opposed as ever to any action of the kind reprobated in Gen. xxxviii. 9, 10; and that it was this primitive abhorrence of all attempts to prevent the natural result of the conjugal act which passed over into Christianity. It follows that the intense antipathy to "birth-control" which is historically characteristic of Catholic Christianity is no Augustinian invention, based upon a morbid theory of the essential evil of sex; on the contrary, it runs back to the earliest days of the elder *Ecclesia*, and is based upon an honourable estimate of marital union, as a holy action with which it would be sacrilege to interfere. It is, therefore, a true intuition of the

* "Talmudic-Rabbinic View on Birth-Control," by Jacob Z. Lauterbach, in *Yearbook of the Central Conference of American Rabbis*, 1927, pp. 369-384.

People of God, which as such demands the loyalty and obedience of all faithful Christians.

Given the principles previously formulated, the existence of such an intuition is sufficient evidence of its validity. Nevertheless it is, I believe, possible in the present instance to discern (so far as such mysteries can be discerned by human faculties) the objective principle determining the intuition. That principle is the absolute sovereignty of God over all life and the propagation of life. God has, indeed, chosen to subject Himself to the will of man, in such a way that when man chooses to perform the sex-act, God thereupon, by His own appointment, is (as it were) constrained to put forth a certain outflow of creative energy. He has, however, reserved to Himself the decision whether such outflow of energy shall result in the generation of a new immortal soul, or not. And the sacrilege of contraception (as of the two other abnormalities traditionally bracketed with it) would seem to reside precisely in the act of stimulating the Divine creativeness, whilst simultaneously taking out of the Divine hands the decision to bring or not to bring into being a new self-conscious spirit, capable of knowing, serving, and loving God for ever.

The thesis of this paper has been that "birth-control" is *per se*, simply and without any qualification, morally wrong—as it was declared to be by the Lambeth Conference of 1908. If this be so, the problem of "hard cases" solves itself; for the Christian cannot admit for a moment that there are any cases too "hard" for Grace to deal with, nor, in this connection, will he pay any regard to the opinions of physicians, however eminent professionally, who do not believe in the supernatural or in the Sacraments, or who do not recognize Grace as a real factor in human lives.

N. P. WILLIAMS.

NOTICES

THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY. By John Dewey. London: George Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d.

In his Gifford Lectures for 1929, now published under the attractive title of *The Quest for Certainty*, Professor Dewey brings to an impressive close the ripe fruits of thirty years of enquiry, teaching, and research. No more attractive exposition of the results of behaviourism in pure philosophy has been given to the world, fascinating in its sustained and trenchant criticism of all philosophies based upon the assumption of an antecedent Reality or Being; attractive in the new prospect offered to philosophy if it will surrender its past and plunge into a future which shall be in a worthy sense "speculation in futures"; if it will abandon the vain search for certainty and follow instead the lead of science in the experimental realization of security.

The book opens with a plain statement of the patent distrust of action by philosophy. Uncertainty seems to dog the doer, certainty seems to be the prerogative of the thinker. But is there no certainty, no security in action, and is there no peril in thought? If knowledge and action could be inseparably related, how would the arts, psychology, philosophy be affected? For today and for two centuries past with the triumphant onward march of physical science increasing certainty characterizes action, increasing and depressing uncertainty hangs about the speculations of thought. Thought has endeavoured to escape from the perils of action by the contemplation of an immutable world secure from change and chance. Intelligently directed action may provide man with an insurance for his future, but philosophy has not been content with this, it has sought assurance. But as science has made all its greatest advance only since it surrendered the high *a priori* way and frankly embarked upon the methods of experiment, so philosophy will only emerge from bankruptcy to solvency when it too surrenders and embarks upon a similar course of "operational thinking." The disinterested pursuit of pure knowledge is indeed a chimera; always what is at stake is the safeguarding of practical values. And not merely the safeguarding. For Dewey there are no antecedent values, no antecedent order of immutable Being, but only values to be, values to be realized, a course of events to be directed and rendered more richly significant with each change. Hence he passes to a severe criticism of the Kantian philosophy with its two worlds, two orders, and its pitiful attempt to bridge the two by means of æsthetic. What rendered Greek science vain and useless was just this æsthetic and qualitative character. Ancient science was one of acceptance of a pre-existent immutable order; modern science does not accept, it initiates and controls. Sense data are not mere objects unchangeable, rather they are for modern science data interpretable, controllable, and positions for further advance. Indeed, Dewey would substitute for the word *data* which implies a pre-existing scheme, the word *takens* which emphasizes the selective control of the human agent in the interests of action, the solution of a present problem leading to realization of a future rather than recognition of a past. Substances immutable must give way to data discoverable. Dewey's aim is not to destroy values as such; but instead of conserving them he would create them. "A moral law," he writes, "like a law in

physics, is not something to swear by and stick to at all hazards: it is a formula of the way to respond when specified conditions present themselves. Its soundness and pertinence are tested by what happens when it is acted upon. Its claim or authority rests finally upon the imperativeness of the situation that has to be dealt with, not upon its own intrinsic nature—as any tool achieves dignity in the measure of needs served by it.”

Philosophy and ethics therefore are to renounce their primitive, almost infantile notions of a pre-existent order of Being and values. The spectator theory of existence must be abandoned; Plato must be deserted for Pierce and pragmatism. Henceforth man is not a mere reporter in a block, a closed universe, he is not even an editor, he is a contributor and a purposive contributor to a Reality being made. Nature is not mechanistic, it is not a machine; it *has* mechanism, but is not itself mechanical. It has mechanism in order that physical science may calculate, infer and foresee, but the individual event remains for ever individual, unique, free, and subject to that law of indeterminacy enunciated by Heisenberg which Dewey regards as of revolutionary significance for philosophy. “The effect of the last observation cannot be eliminated.” “Knowing is seen to be a participant in what is finally known.” “The quest for certainty by means of exact possession in mind of immutable reality is exchanged for search for security by means of active control of the changing course of events. Intelligence in operation, another name for method, becomes the thing most worth winning.” Dewey appreciates the fact that his position tells strongly for freedom, and just as the conflict between religion and science is an illusory one, destined to vanish so soon as religion parts with its *damnosa hereditas* from philosophy of the idea of an antecedent and immutable Reality, so the doctrine of freewill as commonly discussed is, for him, “a desperate attempt to escape from the consequences of the doctrine of fixed and immutable objective Being.” With dissipation of that dogma the need for such a measure of desperation vanishes. “We are free in the degree in which we act knowing what we are about.” “Preferential activities characterize every individual as individual or unique. They become true choices under the direction of insight.” Hence Dewey would have education aim not at the inculcation of fixed conclusions, of inert dead knowledge so called, but rather at the development of intelligence as a method of action. In fact, Dewey’s book is in many respects a restatement of Graham Wallas’ final chapters in his *Great Society*.

The application to religion and theology is not far to seek. He regards them as equally hampered by the unwarrantable premiss of an antecedently fixed and immutable Reality. “Just as rational conceptions were disastrously superimposed upon observed and temporal phenomena, so ‘eternal values’ have been superimposed upon experienced goods.” He indicates that once we get rid of such an idea, once we decline to let past experiences, useful though they may be as registers and tools, become arbiters of things to be further enjoyed, then the future, and not the past, will be man’s guide to life. At this point comes the only express reference to the problem of revelation, and Dewey is singularly silent on the issue. “At present,” he says, “the arbiter is found in the past, although there are many ways of interpreting what in the past is authoritative. Nominally, the most influential conception doubtless is that of a revelation once had or a perfect life once lived.” The tremendous consequences of such an historical revelation are not faced. We are told instead that after

surrendering past values as directive we shall find better successors in the findings of the natural sciences. Conversion of the "eye of the soul," conversion, that is, as it is known in the history of individual saintly lives, will give place to "a conversion of natural and social objects that modifies goods actually experienced." And finally, "all tenets and creeds about good and goods will be recognized as hypotheses." The conclusion is not so alarming as it may seem to some. Readers who are familiar with the Archbishop of York's *Mens Creatrix* will recall the same point with the addition which Dewey does not stop to make, that the Christian hypothesis works better for life than any other hypothesis, and therefore on pragmatic grounds is not to be discarded until a better one appears. Thus for Dewey the real Copernican revolution (wrought by behaviourism) in philosophy is that whereas "the old centre was mind knowing by means of powers complete within itself an antecedent external material equally complete in itself, the new centre is indefinite interactions taking place within a course of nature which is not fixed and complete, but which is capable of direction to new and different results through the mediation of intentional operations. . . . There is a moving whole of interacting parts; a centre emerges wherever there is effort to change them in a particular direction." But what Dewey does not ask or tell us is whether man is the only agent, the only participant in the drama of an onmoving world. He closes with an all too familiar lament that the Church isolates itself from other social institutions and suffers from pride, and he would have the sense of dependence which he accepts as essential in the religious attitude shared by all and not by the few only. Here, he finely writes, "Men will never love their enemies until they cease to have enmities." Hence his call to religion to embark boldly on the experimental method. What a chance for mysticism!

ALBERT A. COCK.

COLERIDGE AS PHILOSOPHER. By J. H. Muirhead, LL.D. Library of Philosophy. George Allen and Unwin. 12s. 6d.

Professor Muirhead, general editor of the Library of Philosophy, has paid Samuel Taylor Coleridge the compliment of undertaking himself this new examination of a philosophy which has attracted increasing attention during the last few years. Everyone knows Coleridge the poet, and many are aware that in later years he became the interpreter of German philosophers whose work was as yet but little known in England, but Professor Muirhead would give him a much higher place than that of a mere interpreter, and believes that Coleridge was the chief pioneer of the idealistic movement in this country.

The author has made good use not only of the published works of Coleridge, but also of important manuscript remains, some of which have been recently edited by Miss Alice D. Snyder. "While they are far from satisfying the expectations which the poet's own allusions to them in his letters and conversations as practically finished compositions raise, they are sufficient to show that he made a far more serious attempt to work out his ideas into clear and consistent form than is commonly supposed." "With a courage and persistency for which he has received too little credit, almost alone, and in spite of his temperamental failings, he pursued the idea of such a comprehensive and organized system of thought as might, at least in his own country, merit the name of philosophy."

The present book, besides an Introduction and a Conclusion, contains eight chapters wherein the author, after a sketch of Coleridge's philosophical development, examines his work in the fields of Logic, Metaphysics, the Philosophy of Nature, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Æsthetics, and the Philosophy of Religion. This is indeed a wide field to be covered in 250 pages, and partly owing to the disconnected nature of the sources, some of the chapters are not easy reading; but on the whole the author has finely succeeded in giving an account of Coleridge's thinking which establishes his contention that amid all "his multifarious and miraculous activity," the poet was a systematic philosopher and not merely a desultory genius. At least he raised issues which occupied philosophers for a century after his death. "The main issue raised by his metaphysics is the sufficiency of a theory that founds itself on the idea of the Absolute as Will. If the central line of English idealistic thought, under Hegel's influence, was destined for two generations to move in an apparently different direction, the fact of the somewhat violent reaction against it which marks the present time bears witness to the vitality and inherent attractiveness of the voluntaristic form of idealistic philosophy, of which Coleridge was the founder, and remains to this day the most distinguished representative."

Not the least interesting part of the book is the chapter on the Philosophy of Religion. Coleridge has long been recognized as the founder of nineteenth-century Broad Church Theology, but here the author is rather concerned with Coleridge's general interpretation of the meaning of religion. "By shifting the emphasis from God as Being or Substance to God as Will, he was able to vindicate the practical nature of Religion, which was later to become the keynote of the treatment of it by British and American writers, and to identify Faith with fidelity to conscience, and the indications of the will of God upon earth as rationally interpreted, instead of with belief in any system of doctrine."

Professor Muirhead's book deserves careful study by all who are interested in the history of modern thought. It is safe to say that Samuel Taylor Coleridge will have a larger place in future histories of philosophy than has been accorded to him in the past.

The portrait of the poet which is printed as the frontispiece seems to bear no resemblance to that which hangs in the Combination Room of his old College at Cambridge.

P. GARDNER-SMITH.

JOSEPHUS AND THE JEWS: THE RELIGION AND HISTORY OF THE JEWS AS EXPLAINED BY FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS. By F. J. Foakes Jackson, D.D. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

This useful volume by a veteran scholar is, with very kindly thought, dedicated to Dr. Nairne, Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, and to his other Jesus College pupils, of whom the present reviewer has the honour of being one. It is a volume which has long been wanted, for it deals mainly with the Maccabæan era and the Roman period; two epochs the study of which is indispensable for the proper understanding of the beginnings of Christianity, and of which so few people know anything. As Dr. Foakes Jackson truly says, it is no easy task to construct a consistent history out of Josephus' voluminous literary output; but it is this task which he has completed and presented in the present volume;

so that the ordinary intelligent reader has before him a clear and succinct record of the history of these times. There will be many, we feel confident, who will be profoundly grateful to have this well-written, well-printed, and cheap volume in their possession.

The book opens with two chapters on the life and religion of Josephus; they contain also, incidentally, some sound remarks on his writings. One sentence of Dr. Foakes Jackson's strikes us as particularly good; in quite a few words he describes Josephus as a writer, and depicts his character with admirable accuracy. Those of us who have had to wade through the often wearisome pages of his works realize how truly Dr. Foakes Jackson writes when he says: "Josephus has many merits as a writer; if at times inaccurate, he is generally entertaining; his character, if ignoble, is interesting as a study; his vanity is frequently amusing; but when he means to be pious he is frankly repulsive, and never more so than in this hypocritical prayer"—which is quoted.

The second part of the book deals with the religion of the Jews in post-exilic times as contained in Josephus, but the main parts are the third, fourth, and fifth, concerned respectively with the Independence of the Jews, the Roman Yoke, and Jewish history after the Fall of Jerusalem.

One of the most useful sections of the book is that which gives a conspectus of the Maccabæan struggle; it is not easy to do this in the clear way in which the author has done. Dr. Foakes Jackson is writing professedly for a non-technical public, and therefore he avoids touching upon some of the difficult problems presented in the history of this struggle, problems which have been brilliantly dealt with by such writers as Schlatter, Willrich, and Kolbe, in recent works, nor must we forget the interesting investigations of Aptowitzer. This is also true of the history of the Roman period, though here we think that Schlatter's very important work ought to have been taken into consideration. However, that is by the way. Dr. Foakes Jackson tells the history in a concise and clear way which will be of great help to students; we are glad also to note that he is fairer to Herod the Great than many writers in the past have been; and that is because he takes *all* the facts and circumstances into account.

We hope and trust that this latest of Dr. Foakes Jackson's work will be read by many, so that the history of a most important period may become better and more widely known.

W. O. E. OESTERLEY.

ORIENTAL HYMN TUNES. Egyptian and Syrian, collected and noted by W. H. T. Gairdner. S.P.C.K. 5s.

The late Canon Temple Gairdner has done a good service to Oriental music in publishing this set of 181 Syrian and Egyptian tunes. There is in the book (pp. 15-23) an interesting account of fifteen Oriental scales, but Canon Gairdner was quite aware that the special tonality of Oriental tunes cannot be represented in our notation without a confusing medley of unfamiliar signs, which he has wisely not attempted. But he has taken the tunes down and transcribed them in the common notation directly from the mouth of competent native singers (p. 8 f.), and seems to me to have been very successful in indicating the phrasing, which is one of the most important factors in any sort of orally preserved melody.

It is difficult to discuss this sort of music except orally; my only

means of comparison at hand is to compare the tunes common to Canon Gairdner's collection and the *Beyrout Hymn Book* of 1880, of which the Preface is signed by Dr. Jessop and Mr. George Ford. This, by the way, is a different edition from the "*Beyrout Hymn Book*" referred to on p. 83. A couple of comparisons may be given. *Jessop*, 56 = *Gairdner*, 21, but the characteristic Oriental melisma of the last bar but one in *G* disappears in *J*. The same may be said of *Jessop*, 165 = *Gairdner*, 119. On the other hand "*Tafta Hindi*" (*Jessop*, 100 = *Gairdner*, 176) is identical in both. It may be remarked that the *Beyrout book* of 1880 shows little sympathy with or understanding of Oriental tunes, so that the amount of agreement between *Jessop* and *Gairdner* is important. It may further be noted that there are one or two very fine Oriental tunes in *Jessop* (e.g., No. 39), which are not in *Gairdner*.

We may add that Canon Gairdner's tunes range from charming simple lilts, such as No. 93, to elaborate broken rhythms, such as No. 69. I wonder what connection No. 103 has with *Leoni*, the well-known tune to "*Yigdal*" (*Dict. of Hymnology*, p. 1151)? In any case this collection may be warmly commended, not only to Orientalists but to every lover of music.

F. C. BURKITT.

ARCHBISHOP HERRING'S VISITATION RETURNS, 1743. Vol. IV. Yorkshire Archæological Society, 1930.

Canon Ollard and the Rev. P. C. Walker steadily pursue the even tenor of their invaluable way, and we can but hope that the Society which is at their back is not financially encumbered by its courageous enterprise. All the more so, as the present volume takes us outside what we now know as the diocese of York down into Nottinghamshire. Newark is here, when it had about 700 families, among them "2 Roman Catholics and 1 Quaker." Bernard Wilson, Old Westminster and pluralist, was the incumbent and kept two unlicensed curates; one had forty pounds a year and the other five shillings a sermon and a "tip" of five guineas each half-year, so that his takings depended on whether the incumbent thought his discourses worth their modest price. As the Easter communicants numbered 400, it is likely that Nonconformity was strong, but Wilson does not say. Then there is St. Mary, Nottingham, with "at least ten thousand Parishioners," of whom a fourth were Dissenters. The Anabaptists were a small body, ministered to by a pensioner of Chelsea Hospital, who had deserted Methodism. But the small parishes are not less interesting. Langar with Barnston has forty-three families, "and, I bless God, never a Dissenter." "I had a Quaker in my parish," says the vicar of Kinalton, but "by honest and persuasive Methods, by cool and mild Reasoning, by the Cogency as well as Authority of Scripture [I] brought him over to ye Church, about a year ago."—The clergy are still puzzled by the Archbishop's question about Holy Communion: "Do your Parishioners send in their names to you as required?" "That Law," says one, "seems to be laid aside by Disuse: I know not where it is or has been practic'd of late, save by Mr. John Westly abroad, and I doubt he made ill use of it." So these dry bones live and stand upon their feet.

ERNEST WORCESTER.

[This review was written a day or two before the lamented death of this remarkable scholar and lovable personality, to whom this Journal has often had reason to be grateful.—ED.]

CATHOLICISM: A RELIGION OF COMMON SENSE. By P. J. Gearon, D.D.
Burns Oates and Washbourne. 2s. 6d.

ROMANISM AND TRUTH. By G. G. Coulton. Faith Press. 3s.

CATHOLIC REUNION. By Spencer Jones. Blackwell. 4s. 6d.

Three books dealing with the Roman controversy may be grouped in one notice. Fr. Gearon's book is strongly recommended as showing the kind of argument that is being used to commend Romanism, presumably with success, to a certain type of mind. A few extracts will show its quality. The Revised Version, among other versions, reveals "serious omissions, additions, and changes in the sacred text" (23). "The Apostles were to become, as it were, gramophones" (74). "Just as the shadow moves with the hand, so Christ in Heaven makes a law when St. Peter (or his successors) makes it"; another illustration is the King of England standing by "the Governor of India in his legislation" (82). The spiritual money earned by the saints, in excess of what they require to pay their spiritual debts, as also the infinite money earned by Christ, is banked, and "the Pope has the key of this bank" (128). The abuses of Indulgences in the Middle Ages are explained by the existence of bogus collectors (130). The indebtedness of the world to Catholicism is illustrated by the researches of M. Chevreul into "saponification" and by the fact that the Italian Prospero Albini was the first writer to mention coffee, to mention a few of the irrelevant examples given.

Dr. Coulton, with immense and detailed care, gives the details of his controversies with outstanding Roman Catholic writers. His vast knowledge of the Middle Ages, here as elsewhere, is used to counteract the one-sided impression that popular writers give of the Ages of Faith. The controversy is rather painful. One feels that the antagonists are too far off to contend to any purpose. The Roman Catholic writers doubtless feel that, whatever small victories Dr. Coulton may win, he misunderstands the mediæval Church so completely that argument with him is unprofitable. So they break off the correspondence and leave him to continue his case in pamphlets and books unanswered. He, on the contrary, is exasperated by their apparent disingenuousness. One reads the present book with mixed feelings. Dr. Coulton convinces the head, up to a point, hardly ever the heart.

Mr. Spencer Jones' book may not unfairly be summarized as a plea that Anglicans should recognize that Rome will never change, therefore reunion is impossible unless we accept Rome's positions. He does not recommend individual secessions, and concludes by urging corporate study to overcome the mountains of prejudice on our side.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

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